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With the rapid development of Internet and the sharp increase of network crime, network
security has become very important and received a lot of attention.
In this dissertation, we model security issues as stochastic systems. This allows us to find
weaknesses in existing security systems and propose new solutions. Exploring the vulnerabilities of
existing security tools can prevent cyber-attacks from taking advantages of the system weaknesses.
We consider The Onion Router (Tor), which is one of the most popular anonymity systems in use
today, and show how to detect a protocol tunnelled through Tor. A hidden Markov model (HMM)
is used to represent the protocol. Hidden Markov models are statistical models of sequential data
like network traffic, and are an effective tool for pattern analysis.
New, flexible and adaptive security schemes are needed to cope with emerging security
threats. We propose a hybrid network security scheme including intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
and honeypots scattered throughout the network. This combines the advantages of two security
technologies. A honeypot is an activity-based network security system, which could be the logical
supplement of the passive detection policies used by IDSs. This integration forces us to balance
security performance versus cost by scheduling device activities for the proposed system. By for-
mulating the scheduling problem as a decentralized partially observable Markov decision process
(DEC-POMDP), decisions are made in a distributed manner at each device without requiring cen-
tralized control.
When using a HMM, it is important to ensure that it accurately represents both the data
used to train the model and the underlying process. Current methods assume that observations
used to construct a HMM completely represent the underlying process. It is often the case that
the training data size is not large enough to adequately capture all statistical dependencies in the
system. It is therefore important to know the statistical significance level that the constructed model
ii
represents the underlying process, not only the training set. We present a method to determine if
the observation data and constructed model fully express the underlying process with a given level
of statistical significance. We apply this approach to detecting the existence of protocols tunnelled
through Tor.
While HMMs are a powerful tool for representing patterns allowing for uncertainties, they
cannot be used for system control. The partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) is a
useful choice for controlling stochastic systems. As a combination of two Markov models, POMDPs
combine the strength of HMM (capturing dynamics that depend on unobserved states) and that of
Markov decision process (MDP) (taking the decision aspect into account). Decision making under
uncertainty is used in many parts of business and science. We use here for security tools.
We propose three approximation methods for discrete-time infinite-horizon POMDPs. One
of the main contributions of our work is high-quality approximation solution for finite-space POMDPs
with the average cost criterion, and their extension to DEC-POMDPs. The solution of the first algo-
rithm is built out of the observable portion when the underlying MDP operates optimally. The other
two methods presented here can be classified as the policy-based approximation schemes, in which
we formulate the POMDP planning as a quadratically constrained linear program (QCLP), which
defines an optimal controller of a desired size. This representation allows a wide range of powerful
nonlinear programming (NLP) algorithms to be used to solve POMDPs. Simulation results for a set
of benchmark problems illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. We show how this tool
could be used to design a network security framework.
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This dissertation is a summary of our studies on different Markov models and their applica-
tions in the area of network security. Markov models can be roughly divided between autonomous
Markov models (e.g., HMM), and those used for control (e.g., POMDP). HMM, POMDP and the
DEC-POMDP are the three Markov models used in this dissertation. HMMs usually serve as
stochastic signal models representing patterns in time series and other sequential data with hidden
states; POMDPs provide broad frameworks for modelling sequential decision making under uncer-
tainty; and DEC-POMDPs extend POMDPs to the case of decentralized multiple-agents. Owing to
their outstanding characteristics (e.g. incorporating multi-level uncertainty and decentralization),
these Markov models are particularly suitable in tackling network-related issues. In spite of the
capabilities of the Markov models, a wide range of challenges remain in constructing, analyzing, and
solving them.
1.1 Traffic Analysis of Tor Protocol
Researchers have done extensive work to provide reliable and confidential means of informa-
tion transmission between parties who want to remain anonymous. Part of the reason for this is that
it is not merely the content of the message being transferred that matters, but critical information
can also be revealed by the identities of the communicating parties. Many low-latency anonymity
systems have emerged, such as Tor [102], JAP [3] and I2P [2], etc. In spite of the effort put into
providing anonymity in communication, traffic analysis has been shown effective in breaking the
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anonymity of these systems. Most anonymity systems are implemented using mixes. However, Zhu
et al. [114] find that most existing mix networks fail against the correlation-based traffic analysis.
Traffic analysis used to be regarded as an aid to cryptanalysis, but now is generally considered as
backbone of communications intelligence [7].
Unlike cryptanalysis trying to crack the sophisticated encryption, traffic analysis ignores
the content of the message and deduces useful information from the meta data associated with the
message. It has been shown that the properties of network traffic (such as packet sizes and timing)
that remain observable after encryption reveal valuable information. By way of example, Buttyan
et al. [25] present a traffic analysis attack on the wireless body area sensor network (BASN) used for
remote patient monitoring. Through analyzing the frequencies used by the radio communications
between the sensors, they can identify the type of the medical sensors, and this information will
further reveal the patient’s health issues.
We concentrate on Tor network as it is one of the most popular anonymity systems world-
wide. We launched a time-domain traffic analysis attack against Tor. Consider a scenario in which
a client communicates with the server through Tor. Assuming the communication protocol used by
the client can be represented by a HMM, we are able to infer a model that is a faithful representation
of the underlying protocol using the timing information collected on the server side. The proposed
model confidence approach is applied to the attack experiment to determine the size of the data
needed to build a statistically significant representative of the protocol.
1.2 Model Confidence
Hidden Markov models analyze real world problems. If an insufficient amount of observation
data is used to generate the HMM, the model will not represent the underlying process. Current
methods assume observations completely represent the underlying process. It is often the case that
the training data size is not large enough to adequately capture all statistical dependencies in the
system. It is therefore important to know the statistical significance level for the constructed model
representing the underlying process, not only the training set.
In this work, we construct minimum entropy HMMs directly from a sequence of observa-
tions [95]. We determine if the observation data and constructed model fully express the underlying
process with a given level of statistical significance. We use the statistics of the process to calculate
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an upper bound on the number of samples required to guarantee that the model has a given level
significance, i.e. the model confidence. We provide theoretical and experimental results that confirm
the utility of this approach. The experiment is conducted on a real private Tor network.
1.3 Combining Intrusion Detection System with Honeypot
Security has become a major concern in computer networking. An IDS monitors real-
time network traffic for suspicious behaviors and alerts the system administrator. In some cases,
IDSs can also be programmed to react. However, traditional passive defensive technologies such as
intrusion detection and firewalls no longer meet the requirements for complex network security. IDSs
require signatures of known attacks and often fail to detect unknown hostile activities while new
attacks are always being found. Considering these limitations, IDSs should not be the sole means of
protection [69].
Many researchers have proposed combining different security strategies to gain better se-
curity performance. We combine IDSs with honeypots. A honeypot is an active defense system
designed to overcome the shortcomings of IDSs. These security resources designed to be probed, or
compromised. Honeypots distract and divert adversaries from important services and machines on
the network. As a result, the threat placed on the real target is mitigated to some extent. At the
same time, honeypots lower the false positive (FP) rates of IDSs by observing the trapped attackers
and their attack techniques. The appealing characteristics make honeypot a beneficial supplement
to IDSs. The main idea is to deploy honeypots that lure malicious traffic by emulating services and
operating systems.
Overhead introduced by the security measures cannot be neglected. For example, IDS FP
rates have led some to question their utility. We propose a fully distributed control scheme that
does not rely on a centralized controller. This makes our scheme generic and flexible.
1.4 Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Full awareness of the consequences of choices is essential for making wise decisions. In
real world applications, such information is often unavailable or in a non-deterministic probability
distribution over the set of all possible outcomes. Knowledge about the current situation is also
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typically incomplete. Markov models are used to solve sequential decision problems. MDPs are
suited to modelling problems in which we are uncertain about the consequences of the choices;
POMDPs are adopted when both the aforementioned uncertainties are present.
POMDPs are control systems that cannot be observed directly. They model stochastic en-
vironments with hidden states. By generalizing MDPs and allowing for more uncertainty, POMDPs
provide a more powerful formalism for modelling realistic problems, especially managing systems
with noisy data or limited sensitivity. A number of problems in industry, business, the military
and social sciences can be modelled as POMDPs, including network trouble shooting, searching for
moving targets, autonomous robot design, marketing, medical diagnosis, etc.
The security posture of the system described in Section 1.3 depends on the state of each
device (IDS or honeypot), as well as the movements of the adversaries, which are non-deterministic.
Each agent decides whether a honeypot or an IDS should be activate based on the local traffic
analysis, which is usually inaccurate. We therefore model the system scheduling as a DEC-POMDP
that accommodate all the uncertainties. Decisions for each agent are made in a distributed manner
by optimizing the tradeoff between security performance and implementation cost.
1.5 Organization
The content of this dissertation is outlined as follows. Chapter 1 describes the motivation
behind the work by exploring the issues and challenges in the fields discussed in each section.
Chapter 2 provides background about the mathematics theories used in this research. Prob-
ability theory and statistics provide the foundation of understanding the properties of the Markov
models. We review basic concepts, as well as selectively explaining the theories and methods needed
for this work. We then present Markov models as the stochastic tools used in coping with the
network security scenarios discussed in this dissertation. The last section is a brief introduction to
SQP, which is one of the most promising NLP algorithms.
The model confidence algorithm is introduced in Chapter 3. Model confidence is a long-
neglected problem when constructing models out of observed data. Most existing methods assume
the observations completely represent the underlying process, while the model confidence algorithm
determines if this assumption is true. We elaborate how to use z-test to calculate the model confi-
dence when constructing the HMM from the observation data sequence. In the end of this chapter,
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two proof-of-concept implementations are demonstrated.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to explaining how to implement the traffic analysis attack over Tor.
We start by detailing how Tor works, followed by a brief literature review of previous attacks on
Tor. This gives some insight into the popular anonymity network. We then explain how we set up
the experiment environment and the experimental procedure. The experimental results show the
need to determine the model confidence in model construction. The effectiveness of the proposed
model confidence algorithm is illustrated by calculating the size of the training data set required for
inferring the communication protocol transmitted through Tor.
In Chapter 5, we propose three novel approaches for solving infinite-horizon POMDPs with
average performance criterion. A survey of existing body of research work is provided to show the
difficulties and challenges in solving this classic model efficiently, as well as the lack of approaches for
average POMDPs. The solution produced by the first approach is inferred from the observable part
when the underlying MDP operates optimally. The simulation results show that the this approach
may give better solutions in some cases. In the second approach, we consider policies of the same
form as the first approach, which are probabilities of actions given a finite-length history. We review
the linear programming (LP) formulation for optimizing average MDPs. In an analogous manner,
we recast the POMDP as a NLP problem, where quadratic constraints are posed to express the
asymptotic convergence property of the process. We compute solutions to the resulting NLP using
SQP. The third approach is also a policy-based method. By extending the policy space to the set
of finite state controllers (FSCs), we solve the POMDP in the same way as the second approach.
We illustrate the utility of the approach by providing empirical results from a set of benchmark
problems.
The proposed hybrid security scheme is detailed in Chapter 6. IDS and honeypot are adopted
in the proposed hybrid network security scheme. The introduction of these two technologies focuses
on the security-related features. An analysis of the capabilities of these two security tools indicates
the need to strike a balance between the security performance and resource usage. There are two
alternative control approaches: centralized control distributed control. From the security point
of view, the distributed version is preferable. We present the DEC-POMDP formulation for the
hybrid network security scheme that combines IDS and honeypot. We then show how to extend the
proposed NLP-based POMDP approach to planning for DEC-POMDPs.
In Chapter 7, we conclude by pointing out our contributions and the weaknesses of the
5




Probability theory and statistics lay the theoretical basis for the work in this thesis. Since
both subjects are of profoundly rich and deep theory, we cannot begin to cover all of the bases in
a dissertation. Interested readers may refer to [58, 89] for a complete introduction of probability
theory and statistics. This chapter provides as much relevant background as possible to help the
readers better understand the topics in the following chapters.
2.1 Basic Concepts in Probability
Probability theory is the mathematical study of random phenomena. Although the outcome
of an random event will not be known before it occurs, the theory of probability provides a way of
quantifying uncertainty regarding the occurrence of events.
2.1.1 Probability Space
The set denoted by Ω is known as the sample space of the experiment. Each outcome ω ∈ Ω
is a complete description of the end state of the experiment. Any subset E of the sample space Ω
is called an event. We define a real function P of the subsets of Ω that satisfies the following three
axioms:
1. 0 ≤ P (E) ≤ 1.
2. P (Ω) = 1.
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3. P (Ei ∪ Ej) = P (Ei) + P (Ej) for disjoint events Ei and Ej , i.e., Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ whenever i 6= j.
P (E) is referred to as the probability of event E. Formally, a probability space is defined for each
random experiment by the triple (Ω,F , P ), where F ⊆ 2Ω (2Ω is the power set of Ω) is the space of
events.
2.1.2 Conditional Probabilities
Conditional distributions are one of the key tools in probability theory for reasoning about
uncertainty. Consider a probability space (Ω,F , P ), suppose an event E ∈ Ω has occurred, how this
affects the probabilities of the remaining events? The probability of an event F occurring given that
E occurs is defined as
P (F |E) = P (F ∩ E)
P (E)
(2.1)
where P (F ∩ E) is the joint probability of events F and E, i.e., the probability of these two events
occurring together at the same time. Two events are called independent if and only if P (E ∩ F ) =
P (E)P (F ), or equivalently, P (E∩F ) = P (E) according to (2.1). Therefore, to say that event E and
F are independent, is precisely to say that observing E does not have any effect on the probability
of F .
We now present three basic yet important rules for manipulating joint probabilities condi-
tional probabilities. The first is known as the Product rule.
Product Rule
P (E ∩ F ) = P (E|F )P (F ) (2.2)
The joint probability of events E and F is the product of the probability that F happens and
the probability that F happens, given E happens.
The second rule we are going to introduce is the Chain rule. It can be seen as a generalization of
the product rule to multiple events.
Chain Rule Apply the product rule repeatedly:
P (∩ni=1Ei = P (E1)P (E2|E1)P (E3|E1 ∩ E2) · · ·P (En| ∩n−1i=1 Ei)) (2.3)
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The last rule covered here is a formula typically used when trying to derive expression from the
conditional probability of one event given another, that is the Bayes rule.
Bayes Rule Suppose now that event E has occurred, we want to find the probability of F . Use
the product rule in (2.2) in both direct and inverse ways, we have that




In practice of performing an experiment, we are mainly interested in some real-valued func-
tions of the outcomes as opposed to the outcome itself. These functions defined on the sample space,
are known as random variables. More formally, a random variable is a function X : Ω→ R. Random
variables play an important role in probability theory. If a random variable takes on a finite or a
countable number of possible values, it is called discrete random variable. There exists an opposing
type of random variables which take on a continuum of values and known as continuous random vari-
ables. One common probability measure of random variables is the cumulative distribution function
(cdf), which is a function FX : R→ [0, 1] defined as
FX(x) = Pr{X ≤ x} (2.5)
Compared with cdf, a more frequently used probability measure for a discrete random variable X is
its probability mass function (pmf) p(x) and is defined as
pX(x) , Pr{X = x} (2.6)
with properties
• 0 ≤ pX(x) ≤ 1.
• ∑x∈Ω pX(x) = 1.
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For the continuous random variables, if the cdp is differentiable everywhere, we define the





There are two most common descriptive quantities that we want to know about a random
variable: expected value and variance. The expected value, also knowns as mean, of a discrete





The variance of a random variable X is a measure of the deviation of the distribution of X from the
expected value and is formally defined by
V ar(X) , E[(X − E(X))2] (2.9)




Bernoulli distribution is the simplest discrete probability distribution. It is used to describe
a trial, or an experiment, which results in a “success” with probability p and in a “failure” with
probability 1 − p. The most classical example of Bernoulli distribution is the toss of coin, in which
the probability of a coin toss coming up heads is p. If we let X equal to 1 if the outcome is a success
and 0 if it is a failure, then X is said to be a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p. The PMF
of X is given by
Pr{X = 1} = p,
Pr{X = 0} = 1− p
(2.10)
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The expected value of the Bernoulli distribution is
E[X ] = p (2.11)
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and its variance is
V ar(X) = p(1− p) (2.12)
Although simple, the Bernoulli distribution is the basic building block for several other probability
distributions, such as the Binomial distribution, geometric distribution, etc.
2.1.5 Normal Distribution





The normal distribution, or Gaussian distribution, is a continuous probability distribution
that can be defined with two parameters µ and σ2. We say that a random variable X is normally
distributed with parameters µ and σ2 if the density function of X is given by




2σ2 , −∞ < x <∞ (2.13)
where µ is the expected value of X and σ2 is the variance. The density function in (2.13), although
does not seem glamorous, is a classic bell curve, which is symmetric about x = µ. Specifically,
the normal distribution with µ = 0 and σ2 = 1 is called the standard normal distribution. The
pdf of a standard normal distribution is shown is Figure 2.1. An important fact about variables




∼ N (0, 1).
These nice properties make the normal distribution the most useful continuous probability
distribution in mathematics, physics and engineering, etc, especially known for its significant role
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in the field of statistical inference. On the basis of the central limit theorem, the random variable
representing the sample means will follow an approximate normal distribution pattern. The larger
the sample size, the more normal the distribution of sample means will become.
2.2 Statistical Hypothesis Test
Statistical hypothesis testing is one of the two major fields in statistical inference; and the
other one is parameter estimation. It is a systematic method for testing a claim about a population
parameter, using observed data. In this method, we test some hypothesis by determining the
likelihood that a sample statistic could have been selected, if the hypothesis regarding the population
parameter were true. The method of hypothesis testing can be summarized in five steps:
1. Formulate the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis.
2. Select the test statistic T . The distribution of T is known if the null hypothesis were true.
3. Select a level of significance (α), which defines the sensitivity of the test.
4. Calculate the test statistic T from the collected sample and convert it to the p-value.
5. Make the decision by comparing the p-value with the significance level α.
The alternative hypothesis is the opposite of the null hypothesis. These two hypotheses
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive so that one is true to the exclusion of the other. There is a
choice of two kinds of hypothesis testing depending on the statement of the alternative hypothesis:
One-tailed test or two-tailed test. Consider the null hypothesis: H1 : µ = µ0. The alternative
hypothesis for a one-tailed test can be stated as either H1 : µ > µ0 or H1 : µ < 0, while that of
the two-tailed test is H1 : µ 6= µ0, which does not make any presupposition the direction of the
difference. Figure 2.2 shows the alternative hypothesis determines whether to place the region of
rejection (also known as the critical region) in one tail or split between both tails of a sampling
distribution.
A test statistic T is a mathematical function of the sample outcomes, such as the sample
mean, and can be used to evaluate the likelihood of obtaining this sample outcome if the null
hypothesis were true. This likelihood is referred to as the p-value.
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Figure 2.2: (a) One-tailed test with the alternative hypothesis H1 : µ < µ0 for significance level
α = 5%. When the test statistic exceeds the critical value z = 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis.
Otherwise, the null hypothesis is retained; (b) Two-tailed test with the alternative hypothesis H1 :
µ 6= µ0 for α = 5%. When the test statistic runs above z = 1.96 or below z = −1.96, the null
hypothesis is rejected.
The level of significance α is a threshold for the likelihood of obtaining the sample mean
if the null hypothesis were true and is equal to the type I error rate. A type I error is defined as
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is actually true. For example, a value of α = 5% implies that
the null hypothesis is rejected 5% of the time when it is in fact true. As shown in Figure 2.2, when
the type of the test is specified, the significance level α determines the critical value (1.645 for the
one-tailed test and 1.96 for the two-tailed test), which are the cutoff value that defines the region of
rejection.
13
We make the decision about the null hypothesis by comparing the p-value with the signifi-
cance level α: If the calculated p-value is less than α, we reject the null hypothesis; otherwise, it will
be retained for want of evidence. Again, consider the example of α = %5, when the probability of
obtaining the sample mean is less than %5 if the null hypothesis were true, we then conclude that
the sample we selected is too unlikely and so we reject the null hypothesis. There are different types
of test statistics. In our work, we use the one-independent sample z-statistic, which is used to test
hypotheses concerning the expected value of a random variable.
2.2.1 z-test
Among several classical statistical tests, z-test is a simple yet widely used statistical test.
The rationale of this test is as following: Given a random sample of size n, that is a sequence
of random variables drawn independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from an unknown
distribution, we are going to make a decision for each value, and this decision will be either correct
or not. Let us consider the distribution of the number of errors that will be made by our classification
system. Since each decision is independent from the others and is binary, it is reasonable to assume
that the random variable X representing the number of errors should follow a Binomial distribution
B(n, p), where p is the error rate. Moreover, it is known that a Binomial distribution B(n, p) can be
approximated by a Normal distribution N (µ, σ2) with
µ = np and σ2 = np(1− p) (2.14)
when n is large enough [86]. Finally, if X ∼ N (np, np(1− p)), then the distribution of the error rate
Y = X
n






∼ N (0, 1).
Given the an i.i.d. sample x1, x2, · · · , xn, if our null hypothesis is that the expected value








and σX is the variance of X . The conversion process in (2.15) is called standardiz-
ing or normalizing and the result is called standard score, or z-score. The z-score defines how many
standard deviations below or above the population mean the sample mean is under the null hypoth-
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esis. In most cases, however, σX is unknown and can be replaced with the variance of the sample
x1, x2, · · · , xn as long as n is sufficiently large. With the test statistic z, for a given significance level
α, we then calculate the one-tailed or two-tailed p-value. We reject the null hypothesis if the p-value
is less than α and accept it otherwise. Or, since the z statistic will follow the standard normal
distribution if the null hypothesis were true, the decision as to whether reject the null hypothesis
can also be made by comparing the z statistic with the critical value without converting it to the
p-value.
2.3 Markov Models
In probability theory and statistics, the term “Markov” means memoryless [106]. That is,
the future states of the process are independent of the past history and depends solely on the present
state. Formally, a Markov model is a stochastic process that goes through a set of states over time,
in which the probability of transition to any of the other states only depends on the current state.
The members of Markov model family have shown to be useful in a wide range of applications, such
as pattern recognition, decision making, etc. The four most common Markov models will be used in
this context and their relation are summarized in the following table [105]:
Table 2.1: Markov models and their relations
Fully observable Partially observable
Autonomous Markov chain Hidden Markov model
process (HMM)
Single Markov decision process Partially observable
controller (MDP) Markov decision process (POMDP)
Multiple controllers Decentralized Decentralized partially observable
with the Markov decision process Markov decision process
same objective (DEC-MDP) (DEC-POMDP)
2.3.1 Markov Chain
Markov chain is the first and simplest statistical Markov model involved in this thesis.
Consider a process that is observed at discrete time points t = 1, 2, · · · that will be called steps. At
each instant of time t, the state of the process is denoted by St. St takes on values from a finite
or countable set S = {1, 2, · · · , N}, which will be called the state space. If St = n, the the process
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is said to be in state n at time t. For every s, s′ ∈ S, we assume that whenever the process is in
state s, there exists a stationary probability Pss′ that the process will be in state s
′. That is, Pss′ is
independent of time and any previous states. Such a stochastic process is known as a Markov chain.
Markov chain is the first Markov model introduced in this thesis, as well as the most basic model
in the family. All the other Markov models can be considered as extensions of the Markov chain,
which are designed to allow modelling of a wide range of real-world situations.
We have defined the one-step transition probability Pss′ . Let P denote the matrix of one-
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We now define the n-step transition probabilities Pnss′ as the probability that the process currently in
state s will be in state s′ in n transition steps. If we let P(n) denote the matrix of n-step transition
probabilities, we have that
P(n) = Pn (2.17)
That is, the n-step transition matrix can be obtained by multiplying the one-step matrix P by itself
n times. If Pnss′ > 0 for some n > 0, we say that state s
′ is accessible from state s′. Furthermore, two
states that are accessible to each other are said to communicate. If all states in S communicate with
each other, the Markov chain is said to be irreducible. That is, it is possible to get to any state from
any state. Consider the irreducible Markov chain illustrated in Figure 2.3 where nodes are states
and edges are transitions. If one wants to go from state 2 to state 1, for example, an available path
is 2→ 3→ 1. We are now ready to present the most important property of an irreducible Markov
chain.
For an s, s′ ∈ S of an irreducible Markov chain, limn→∞ Pnss′ exists and does not depend
on the initial state s. If we let π′s = limn→∞ P
n
ss′ , the vector Π = [π1, π2, · · · , πN ] is called the





























By way of example, the one-step transition probability matrix of the Markov chain shown in Fig-




























Use (2.18), the asymptotic probabilities must satisfy
0.3π1 + 0.4π3 = π1
0.55π1 + 0.25π2 + 0.5π3 = π2
0.15π1 + 0.75π2 + 0.1π3 = π3
π1 + π2 + π3 = 1
(2.20)
These solve to yield
π1 = 0.212, π2 = 0.417, π3 = 0.371 (2.21)
Each entry πs is called the asymptotic (limiting) probability of state s. The stationary
distribution has two interpretations:
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1. Each entry πs is the limiting probability that the Markov chain will be in state s infinitely far
into the future; Or
2. πs represents the long-run proportion of time that the Markov chain is in state s.
2.3.2 Hidden Markov Models
A standard hidden Markov model (HMM) is a N -state Markov chain observed at discrete
time points t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Let S = {1, 2, · · · , N} represent the finite state space, if we use the
random variable St to denote state of the HMM at time t, St = s means the HMM is in state s ∈ S
at time step t. But St cannot be directly observed. We instead see one output Ot = o ∈ O, where
O = {1, 2, · · · ,M} denotes the finite set of outputs, also known as observations. Two probability
distributions are defined for each state s ∈ S to represent rules on state transition and output
emission respectively:
• The state transition law
P s
′
s = Pr{St+1 = s′|St = s}, ∀s, s′ ∈ S, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · (2.22)
• And the observation probabilities
P os = Pr{Ot = o|St = s), ∀s ∈ S, o ∈ O, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · (2.23)
S















Figure 2.4: A HMM process and its two stochastic processes: the process of states {St} and the
process observations {Ot}.
As shown in Figure 2.4, the two probability distributions of a HMM generate two parallel stochastic
processes [83]: the process of states and that of observations.
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In this thesis, we focus on the inference problems about HMMs and consider a specific infer-
ence algorithm – the causal-state splitting reconstruction (CSSR) algorithm. This HMM inference
approach developed by Shalizi et al. [95] produces state machines, deterministic in transition output,
i.e., where each observation is mapped to at most one transition leaving a state. We will talk about
deterministic HMMs in more detail in Section 3.3.1. Furthermore, the underlying Markov chain of
the HMM generated using Shalizi’s method is irreducible with all transient states removed [95].
Models are used to describe real-world situations, and HMMs are no exception. HMMs
have found many applications in pattern recognition. The most famous area is speech technology, in
which the main HMM application is speech recognition. HMMs are also known for their application
to bioinformatics, in which HMMs are used for gene finding, modeling protein families, protein
structure prediction, and multiple sequence alignment. Other areas of application include image
processing, communications, signal processing, finance, traffic modelling, learning behavior of live
and artificial systems, etc.
2.3.3 Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are control systems that can-
not be observed directly. They commonly model stochastic environments with hidden states. By
generalizing MDPs and allowing for more uncertainty, POMDPs provide a more powerful formalism
for modelling realistic problems, especially managing systems with noisy data or limited sensibility.
Formally, a POMDP is specified as a 6-tuple 〈S,A,O, T, Z, r〉, where
• S = {1, 2, · · · , N} is a finite set of states.
• A = {1, 2, · · · ,M} is a finite set of actions.
• O = {1, 2, · · · ,K} is a finite set of observations, or outputs.
• T : S × A × S → [0, 1] is the state transition function. T (s, a, s′) = Pr(s′|s, a) represents the
probability of transferring to state s′ after taking action a in state s
• Z : A×S ×O → [0, 1] is the observation probability function. Z(a, s′, o) = Pr(o|a, s′) denotes
the probability of seeing o in state s′ after taking action a in the previous step.













Figure 2.5: Influence diagram showing the dependencies between different elements comprising a
POMDP, which meanwhile prove the Markov property. Solid arrows represent dependencies exist
(e.g., St+1 depend on both St and At).
At each point of time, the system is in some state s ∈ S. The agent takes an action a ∈ A,
which immediately yields a reward r(s, a) and triggers a transition to a new state s′ ∈ S in the next
step with probability T (s, a, s′). The three elements, S, A and T form the core-MDP, and determine
the dynamics of the POMDP. But, unlike regular MDPs, the agent cannot observe the state of the
core-MDP during the decision process. Instead, he receives an observation o′ ∈ O with probability
function Z(a, s′, o′).
Unlike HMMs running autonomously, POMDPs are driven by actions chosen by the agents,
or controllers. The goal of studying POMDPs is to find a sequence of actions {At}t=1,2,···, known
as a policy that makes the system operate in the way the agents desire. The policy is measured
by a payoff function, which is a mathematical function of the immediate rewards. The agent’s
objective is to optimize the payoff function accordingly. However, due to the partial observability,
finding the optimal policy incurs prohibitive computational overhead [61]. Developing effective and
scalable algorithms for solving POMDPs has become a thriving subject of artificial intelligence (AI)
research [33, 60, 63].
2.3.4 Decentralized Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
When decision making becomes a team work, in which multiple agents need to coordinate
without effective communication and even unclear about their own local situation, the decentralized
partially observable Markov decision process (DEC-POMDP) is the primary tool used in decision
theory to solve this type of problems [11]. As the extension of the POMDP to the case of multiple
agents, the DEC-POMDP is a more general and more powerful modeling tool. Nevertheless, solving
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DEC-POMDPs usually incurs prohibitive computational overhead.
A DEC-POMDP can formally be defined by a tuple {S,K,A1, · · · ,AK ,O1, · · · ,OK , R, P,Q},
where
• S is a finite set of states.
• K is the number of agents.
• A(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ K is the action space of agent k.
• O(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ K is the observation space of agent k.
• R : S ×A(1) × · · ·A(K) → R is the immediate reward function.
• P : S × A(1) × · · ·A(K) × S → [0, 1] is the state transition probability function. Let a =
[a1, a2, · · · , aK ], where ak ∈ A(K), P (s, a, s′) represents the probability of transitioning from
state s into state s′.
• Q : A(1) × · · ·A(K) × S × O(1) × O(2) × · · ·O(K) → [0, 1] is the state transition probability
function. Let o = [o1, o2, · · · , oK ], where ok ∈ O(k), Q(a, s′, o) represents the probability of
receiving the observation sequence o in state s′ after agent k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K takes action ak in the
previous step.
From the definition, we can see that each agent needs a local policy. But it is the joint actions that
effect the dynamics of as well as the global reward.
2.4 Finite State Controller
Although any POMDP policy can be represented by a policy graph, some infinite horizon
policies may require infinite policy graphs [23]. Therefore, most policy-based algorithms restrict
their search to finite policy graphs i.e., finite state controllers (FSCs). A FSC may be defined as an
extension of a probabilistic automaton 〈N ,A, y, b0, E〉 [82], together with a probability distribution
x : N ×A → [0, 1], and an output set O, where
• N is a finite set of internal states of the controller.
• A is the action set of the POMDP.
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• O is the observation set of the POMDP.
• y : N × O × N → [0, 1] is the state transition function. y(n, o′, n′) = Pr(n′|n, o′) is the
transition probability of ending in n′ from state n after seeing o′.
• b0 is the initial belief state.
• E ⊆ N is the set of accepting states.
• x : N × A → [0, 1] is the action selection function. x(n, a) = Pr(a|n) is the probability of
taking action a ∈ A in state n ∈ N ,
Since there is no notion of accepting state for FSCs, E is usually omitted. Moreover, the ǫ-optimal
FSC for an average POMDP does not depend on the initial belief b0. The definition of FSC can
therefore be reduced to 〈N ,A,O, x, y〉, where A and O are known with a given POMDP. This leaves
only two unknown variables: x and y.
At each step t, the FSC takes an a ∈ A as input in state n ∈ N and generates an observation
o′ in the next step in response. The internal state transition is probabilistic, and driven by the most
recent history as seen with the definition of y. The number of internal states |N | represents the
size of the FSC, as well as the amount of memory of the agent [23]. The internal states are fully
observable to the agent during the decision making process, who selects the action to take at each
node n ∈ N according to the function x.
2.5 Sequential Quadratic Programming
Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) is one of the most successful methods for solving
nonlinear constrained optimization problems. It is composed of many algorithms rather than a single
algorithm, and relies on a profound theoretical foundation. SQP has shown superior effectiveness
in solving general large-scale nonlinear programming problems. Throughout this section, we shall
consider the following NLP problem:
min f(x)





where x is a vector of n components; f : R → Rn is the objective functional; the functions h(x) :
R
n → Rm and g(x) : Rn → Rl are respectively the equality and inequality constraints.
SQP solves the NLP converting it to a sequence of quadratic programming (QP) problems.
At each iteration, the original NLP is reformulated as a QP subproblem by linearizing the con-
straints and replacing the objective function f(x) with its local quadratic approximation. The QP





s. t. ▽ g(xk)Td+ g(xk) ≤ 0
▽ h(xk)T d+ h(xk) = 0
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k, · · · , xnk ];
and Bk := Hf(xk) is the Hessian of f(x) at xk, i.e., the matrix of second partial derivatives of f(x).
Suppose xk is the solution of the QP subproblem for iteration k, which is actually an
estimate of the solution to the original NLP. In this way, the sequence of {xk}k∈N0 converges to a
local optimum x∗ of the NLP. The basic idea of SQP is analogous to the Newton and quasi-Newton
methods. However, the presence of constraints renders both the analysis and the implementation
of SQP methods much more complicated [54]. There are a variety of NLPs, and for which there
are customized SQP methods for their solution. These NLPs include systems of unconstrained
optimization, linearly constrained optimization and nonlinearly constrained optimization. We phrase




3.1 Model Fidelity & Model Confidence
Markov models are commonly used in pattern recognition [20] to express the deterministic
and stochastic components of real-world processes. When using a model, it is useful to ensure that it
accurately represents both the data used to train the model and the underlying process. Particularly,
we consider the approach developed by J. P. Crutchfield and C. R. Shalizi [95], known as Causal-State
Splitting Reconstruction (CSSR), which derives the HMM state structure and transition matrix from
available data samples. The CSSR algorithm [95], as well as its improved algorithm [93], generates
deterministic HMMs with each transition uniquely specified by an output symbol, also known as an
observation. According to Rabiner [83], these HMMs are equivalent to the traditional HMMs and
conversions are possible between the two. When these models are dynamically constructed from
observations, two questions are raised:
1. Does the model match the observations? and
2. Are we confident that the model and observations represent the actual underlying process?
The first question refers to the model fidelity, which measures the agreement between the
inferred model and the training data; the second question refers to the model confidence, which
means the degree to which a model represents the underlying process that generates the training
data. We address the second question. As shown in Figure 3.1, an underlying process is observed








Figure 3.1: Hierarchy of the process, observations, and model showing the relationship between
model fidelity and model confidence
to construct a minimum entropy HMM [95]. In the model fidelity literature, the observations are
assumed to completely represent the underlying process. Model fidelity is therefore a measure of how
well the constructed model matches the observations. While similar, model confidence is different
from model fidelity, which is a measure of how well the model matches the underlying process. We
assume only that the process being observed has a finite number of states and that state transition
probabilities are stationary. This assumption ensures that the training data set cannot be a biased
representation of the underlying process and thus avoids overtraining.
3.2 Related Work
The fidelity of a model is a measure of the similarity between the inferred model and the
training data. Lee [59] and Nechyba [77] use a HMM to generate a similarity value between the model
and observations. They assume that the training data fully represents the process under observation.
However, if the training data is insufficient, the model parameters may only represent the training
data set, not the process that produced the data. A large body of research proposes solutions for
modeling with insufficient data [44,62,104,108,113]. While these approaches enable models to more
effectively recognize a larger set of input data, it is important to recognize that artifacts may be
introduced into the model by these processes. Overtraining is one of many problems of the kind.
In this work, we propose a solution for finding model confidence. Inferred models will match
the training datasets. A more important question is whether the training data fully represents the
process being modelled. However, model confidence receives less research attention than model
fidelity. Most of previous model evaluations are performed by comparing the output of the con-
structed model to test data [73, 87, 90]. Hansen [53] introduces model confidence set to select the
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best model with a given level of confidence based on the assumption that a set of constructed models
are available.
We show how model confidence can be measured for systems with a finite number of states
and stationary transition probabilities. The approach we present here is similar to the work of
Rajgopal [84]. They use the Poisson approximation and assume the probabilities of failure tend to
zero as the number of samples increases to infinity. Over the long term with many large samples, this
approximation is valid when the probabilities are significantly smaller than the number of samples.
In our work, we assume that probabilities are stationary but we may not have enough samples for
an approximation to hold. We also calculate the amount of data needed to be confident that all
transitions with probability bigger than a known value are statistically adequately included in the
model. We derive model confidence from this information.
3.3 Model Construction
The procedure for model inference is an open problem for many different applications, such
as network modeling, prospective modeling and behaviour modeling [12, 65, 78]. Traditionally, the
Baum-Welch algorithm [17, 83] is used to infer the state transition matrix of a Markov chain and
symbol output probabilities associated with state transitions, given an initial Markov model and a
sequence of symbolic output values. The Baum-Welch Algorithm uses expectation maximization to
solve a non-linear optimization problem. Recently, some novel and promising approaches for HMM
construction were proposed. Unlike most automatic methods, the interactive HMM construction
approach proposed by Jaroszewicz [56] finds patterns that are not included in current HMM and
presents them to users, who then update the model. The resulting model is therefore more under-
standable. The optimality of the HMMs built also has been extensively studied. By defining the
optimality criterion as the divergence rate between the underlying process and HMM, Finesso [46]
presents a constructive algorithm for generating best approximation HMMs of an assigned complex-
ity.
Most of the existing HMM construction methods require an initial model structure that
is used as a starting point to estimate the model’s parameters. To construct a Markov model
without a priori structural information, we extend the CSSR algorithm. Assume we are given
sufficient training data of length D over the finite alphabet O, Shalizi’s approach finds statistically
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significant groupings of the training data that correspond to HMM states. This is done by analyzing
conditional probabilities for a data window that slides over the training data. This data window
increases gradually from a size of two to an initially known maximum window size L. The parameter
L expresses the maximum number of symbols that are statistically relevant to the next symbol in
the sequence.
Although Shalizi’s approach allows us to construct HMMs without a priori knowledge of
the structure, their implementation relies on two critical assumptions: The optimal value of L was
known; And there was more than enough data in the input observation sequence. In developing a
mathematical algorithm for solving a real-world problem it is always preferable and even imperative
to ensure simplifying assumptions so as to render the implementation in practice feasible. Schwier et
al. later develop an algorithm [93] to show how to find the optimal value of L automatically, known
as the zero knowledge HMM inference algorithm. This resolves the first assumption and leaves us
only the size of the training data set needed to be determined. This is where the work presented in
this chapter applies.
Since slight variations exist between the HMMs constructed using CSSR and the standard
model defined in section 2.3.2, before delving into the implementation of CSSR, we will elaborate a
bit further on the particular type of HMMs generated by CSSR, as well as the improved algorithm.
3.3.1 Deterministic HMMs
HMMs generated with CSSR are known as the deterministic HMMs and may be denoted
by a 4-tuple G = 〈S,O,Λ, ζ〉, where S is a finite set of states, O is a finite set of observations,
Λ ⊆ S ×O × S is a transition relation, and ζ : Λ→ [0, 1] is a probability function such that
∑
o′∈O,s′∈S
ζ(s, o, s′) = 1 ∀s ∈ S (3.1)
The deterministic characteristic of the deterministic HMMs is fully reflected in (3.1). In words, given
the current state s and the observation o seen after the transition takes place, the state of the next
step s′ is determined. The property of the model being deterministic can be expressed as follows for
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each s ∈ S:
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Due to this characteristic, a more precise representation of the deterministic HMMs is possible.
Figure 3.3.1 shows a SHMM and an instance of the deterministic HMM of the same structure
(deterministic HMMs with the same number of states and observations). Unlike the SHMM in
which no deterministic relation exists between a state and its output given the previous state, one
observation is assigned to each transition in the deterministic HMM. Moreover, the representation
provides us another interpretation the deterministic characteristic, which is there will not be more
than one outgoing transitions associated with the same observation for each state.
Recall that the standard model in [83] has two sets of random processes: states and outputs.
To be consistent with [95] we use this alternate model, i.e., deterministic HMM, also mentioned
in [83] and [14], with only a single set of random processes. In the deterministic HMM, as indicated
in Equation (3.1), transitions between states correspond directly to output symbols. The process
developed by [95] produces state machines, deterministic in transition symbol, i.e. where each symbol
is mapped to at most one transition leaving a state.
3.3.2 Inferring HMMs – CSSR
Let O be a finite set of symbols or alphabet representing the observation space of a system.
If y is a sequence in O, then we write yD = O1O2 . . . OD to denote the elements of y. We assume
yD is the symbolic output of an unknown system. We also assume this system can be represented
as a Markov chain and the probabilities of transitions between states remain constant over time.
Our work is an extension to the CSSR algorithm [95], which infers the state and transition
structure, given training data yD and data window size L. This output model is the minimum
entropy estimate of the true underlying process. In this approach, each state is associated with a set
of subsequences of yD with same conditional probability distributions over the next symbol generated
by the process. Defining the states in this manner allows the system to tolerate noise and uncertainty
in the observation sequence and still maintain the deterministic behavious of the system. The
algorithm has useful information-theoretic properties in that it maximizes the mutual information



















































Figure 3.2: A 3-state 3-observation standard HMM and an instance of its deterministic counterparts.
produced Markov chain is irreducible with all transient states removed from the model.
The HMM inference algorithm is straightforward. We are given a sequence yD and know
a priori the value L ∈ N. In [93] we show how the value of L can be established as part of the
HMM learning process, so that the HMM can be learned with no a priori knowledge as long as the
underlying system has a finite number of states and the transition probabilities are stationary. For
values of l increasing from 0 to L, we identify the set of sequences W that are subsequences of y and
have length l. (When l = 0, the empty string is considered to be a subsequence of y.) We compute
the conditional distribution of the next symbol following each x ∈ W using the data provided in y
and partition the subsequences according to these distributions. Let #(x,y) be the number of times
the sequence x is observed as a subsequence of y, the conditional probability distribution over the
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next input symbol o is given by




These partitions become states in the inferred HMM. If states already exist, we compare fox|y(o) to
the conditional distribution of the existing states, denoted by fs|y(o). That is the probability given
the system is in state s, that the next symbol observed will be o. The following formula can be used
to compute fs|y(o).






We add x to this state if the conditional distributions are ruled statistically identical. If
sequence x may be added to many states, the state with the best fit is chosen. Distribution com-
parison can be carried out using a χ2 goodness of fit with a specified level of confidence. The level
of confidence chosen affects the type I error rate. Once state generation is complete, the states are
further split to ensure that the inferred model has a deterministic transition relation with respect
to symbols. Reconstruction merges states when possible in order to avoid creating an unnecessarily
large number of states.
The complexity of the HMM inference algorithm is O(|O|L+1)+ O(D), where |O| is the size
of the alphabet and L is the maximum subsequence length considered. Given a stream of symbols
y, of fixed length D, from observation set O, the algorithm is linear in the length of the input data
set, but exponential in the size of the alphabet.
Note that [93] estimates conditional probabilities by analyzing grouped sets of outputs from
a stochastic process. As long as the assumption that the volume of training data holds, the law
of large numbers dictates that this is asymptotically true. We provide a criterion for determining
whether or not a HMM adequately matches the data stream [24]. Another critical assumption is
that the observation set O includes all observations. If this is not the case, readers can refer to [50]
for an observation set inference algorithm.
Note that CSSR [95] estimates conditional probabilities by analyzing grouped sets of outputs
from a stochastic process. As long as the assumption that the volume of training data is sufficient,
the law of large numbers dictates that this is almost surely true. This would not be the case if one
were considering only one instance of a small output string. Schwier et al. [93] show how the value of
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L can be established as part of the HMM learning process, so that the HMM can be learned with no
a priori knowledge as long as the underlying system has a finite number of states and the transition
probabilities are stationary.
We have had success in using this approach as a component of a system for modeling
behaviouss of ships [50]. For symbols, we use the Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) [10]. As
a ship traverses the globe, it produces symbols corresponding to grid regions in MGRS. The result
is a Markov chain describing the probabilistic motion of a vessel as it traverses the planet. Within
the regions, we also use linear models of a ship’s to further refine the predictions. The inferred
HMM and the linear models work together to produce predictions of ship location and to identify
anomalies in ship behavior.
We have also used the inferred HMM to model consumer behavior of movie rentals. We
represent each movie with a single genre, and track an individual’s movie preferences using data
extracted from the Netflix challenge data set [19]. Each state represents a portion of the consumer’s
rental history classified by movie genres, and each transition represents the probability of a rental
















Figure 3.3: Example consumer behavior from the Netflix data set
3.4 Model Confidence of HMMs
We first put forward the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given a HMM and a sequence of observations yD generated from the HMM. Con-
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sider a state s ∈ S and an outgoing transition δ from state s, let P (δ) be the probability that transition
δ occurs, we have
P (δ) = πs · γδs (3.5)
where γδs denotes the probability that transition δ is taken given that the process is currently in state
s. For any η ∈ (0, 1), there exists a number 0 < ǫ 6 πs such that for any transition δ with P (δ) ≤ ǫ,
the probability that transition δ is not detected by yD is bigger than η. The relations between D, η
and ǫ are given by
ǫ < πs(1− η
1
πsD ) (3.6)
where πs is the asymptotic probability of state s.
Proof. Consider an outgoing transition δ from state s with P (δ) = ǫ, where 0 < ǫ 6 πs. Whenever
state s is visited, the random variable representing the occurrence of transition δ follows a Bernoulli
distribution with success probability




Suppose D is large enough, the estimated number of times that state s is visited in yD is Ds = πsD.
Thus the probability that transition δ is not included in yD is
(1− p)Ds = (1− p)πsD (3.8)
If this probability is bounded below by η, we will have
(1 − p)πsD > η (3.9)
We have from the preceding equation that
p < 1− η 1πsD (3.10)
Substituting Equation (3.7) into the Equation (5.38) yields




This completes the proof.
As η → 1, ǫ → 0 but, for any η < 1, ǫ 6= 0. In effect, the expression in Equation (3.11)
can fully reflect the relations between training data volume and model uncertainty with respect to
transitions whose probabilities satisfying a certain constraint. To go in to detail,
1. given any fixed-length sequence of observations yD, a larger η gives a lower ǫ.
2. If we fix the value of η and increase D, ǫ will decrease exponentially with D.
3. Finally, an exponential growth of D is needed with respect to η in order to maintain a fixed ǫ.
This analysis provides a boundary value for any of these three variables, when the other two
are fixed, by
ǫ = πs(1− η
1
πsD ) (3.12)
The rest of the chapter applies this insight by deriving statistical tools for determining when this
threshold is satisfied. We will also show that, for the entire model, there will be one single threshold
value that can verify this property for all states.
Let Ks be the set of detected outgoing transitions from state s. As an example using the
model in Figure 3.4a, K1 = {(1, A), (1, C)}. Let Us be the set of unobserved outgoing transitions
from s. For the model in Figure 3.4b, U1 = {(1, B)} and U2 = {(2, B), (2, C)}. Obviously, Ks∩Us =
∅, ∀s ∈ S. Now we collect more testing data to traverse the model. The current model is found to
be incomplete once a transition δ ∈ ⋃s∈S Us occurs. According to Proposition 1, we can never be





s, · · · , ǫ|Us|s ) (3.13)
and for all states we define ǫ∗ by
ǫ∗ = max(ǫ1, ǫ2, · · · , ǫ|S|) (3.14)
Thus ǫ∗ represents the maximum transition probability of all unobserved transitions. Our goal is
to determine the total number of samples, D, such that ǫ∗ is less than a user defined threshold ǫ.

























Figure 3.4: Example of known and unknown transitions for alphabet O = {A,B,C}. Solid transi-
tions are known and given probabilities calculated from input data. Dashed transitions are possible,
but unlikely to be found in the training data set. (a) Inferred HMM; (b) Actual model.
in the model constructed with output symbol string yD. Therefore, a larger value of ǫ decreases the
amount of data needed for confidence that yD includes any transition with probability no smaller
than ǫ but increases the risk of Us 6= ∅, ∀s ∈ S. A smaller threshold value decreases this risk but
may require significant amounts of data.
3.5 Model Confidence Algorithm
Suppose we have constructed a HMM using the zero knowledge HMM inference algorithm
[93] from an observation sequence yD. Consider a transition δ with probability ǫ. Without loss
of generality, assume that δ is a transition emanating from state s and 0 < ǫ 6 πs. If we use the
notation γδs to denote the conditional probability of δ being taken given that the system is currently










where ns is the number of times state s is entered during the observation of y
D.
For state s, we use the z-test [22] to determine if the inferred model will include all transitions
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with probabilities no smaller than γǫs with desired significance. The z-test also finds the minimum
amount of training samples needed for δ to be detected with this given level of significance. As
mentioned in Section 3.3.2, the constructed Markov chain is irreducible.
The next step is to define the test statistic for state s. Let XUs be a random variable
following Bernoulli distribution with success probability ps, we use X
U
s to describe the occurrence
of an unobserved transition conditioning on the process currently being at state s. We can test the
null hypothesis H0: ps = γ
δ
s against the alternative hypothesis H1: ps < γ
δ
s . Let X
U
s denote the
sample average of XUs , we use γ
δ
s −XUs as a test statistic, rejecting the null hypothesis if γδs −XUs














The reference normal distribution statistic, zα with confidence α can be found in statistics text-
books [22]. If zs < zα, we accept H0 and we need to collect more data. Otherwise, we say that
sufficient data has been collected. The following two lemmas show that the z-test needs only to be
performed once for all states.
Lemma 1. For given z-statistics z1 and z2, the statistic min{z1, z2} may be compared to the reference
z-statistic in lieu of testing z1 and z2 individually.
Proof. Assume γδs is held constant for the experiment and is the same for z1 and z2. From Equation
(3.18), zs ∝
√
ns. Without loss of generality, let us assume that z1 = min{z1, z2}. Since ns ∈ N+
and
√
ns > 1, in order for z1 < z2 to hold, n1 < n2. The objective of comparing to the reference
statistic is to find the amount of data needed for a specified level of confidence. If z1 > zα then
consequently z2 > zα. Since more data is required for z1 to meet this condition, the minimum of z1
and z2 satisfies both the statistical and application requirements.
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For determining if the current model is statistically sufficient to detect an outgoing transition with
probability of occurrence ǫ, z-test only needs to be performed once using zexp as the test statistic.
Proof. The proof is a simple extension of the proof for Lemma 1 which accounts for more than two
z-statistics and is omitted.
If we cannot reject the null hypothesis for all states, then we need to estimate how much
more training data should be collected for reconstruction. Assume that the state structure of the
model built from yD is complete with respect to the underlying process, we can easily calculate the
minimum amount of training data Dα required for rejecting the null hypothesis H0 by letting the






Solving for ns in terms of γ
δ










Therefore, we need to extend the training data sequence by collecting Dα −D more observations.





(1 − P (Z < zs)) (3.23)
where zs is the statistic calculated for state s using Equation (3.18) and P (Z < zs) is the probability
that a normal distribution has a value smaller than zs.
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To use the z-test in this manner, we propose a simple algorithm to perform on-line testing of
the observation sequence. The algorithm determines if a constructed model statistically represents
a data stream in the process of being collected. We first collect a sequence of observation data y
of some length D and construct a model from the collected data. With the constructed model, we
determine the z-statistics and find if the experimental statistic provides 100 · (1 − α)% confidence
that a transition with probability ǫ does not occur. If y is not sufficiently long, we will be unable to
construct a model from the data; additional data should be gathered. The algorithm is provided in
Algorithm 3.5.1.
Algorithm Description 3.5.1 – Proposed Algorithm
Input: Recurring observation yt for time t; Alphabet O; User-defined threshold ǫ and confidence level α;
Output: Model confidence αf ; Required length of |y| D;
From time t = 0:
(1) Construct model Gt from sequence y = y0y1 · · · yt.
(2) Calculate the asymptotic state probabilities πs for ∀s ∈ S .
(3) Use Equation (3.15) to determine the values for γδs for ∀ s ∈ S .
(4) Calculate the experimental statistics zs for each state using Equation (3.18).
(5) Find zexp using Equation (3.19) in Lemma 2.
(6) If zexp > zα, conclude Gt sufficiently represents the underlying process with the desired level of
confidence and D = |y|; calculate αf using Equation (3.23); stop.
(7) Else, collect more data until |y| = Dα, where Dα is calculated using Equation (3.21); go to step (1).
To sum up, we make the following assumptions about the observation data and our knowl-
edge about the underlying process. First, the process under consideration has a finite number of
states and the transition probabilities are stationary. This assumption ensures that the training
data set fully represents the process. Also, the alphabet O is complete and contains all expected
observations. By assuming this, our approach is restricted to finding “known unknowns” [91] within
a given level of statistical confidence α. If an observation is not in the alphabet, i.e. is an “unknown
unknown,” [91] the transition does not factor into the confidence in or probability of an unknown
transition. In addition, if Ks = O and Us = ∅, the state does not have any possible untaken
outgoing transitions. No more transitions are available to exit the state and testing the state does
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Figure 3.5: Example 1: (a) Original model; (b) Model constructed from 10,000 packets; (b) Model
constructed from 100,000 packets.
3.6 Proof-of-Concept
The experiments presented in this section are simple. The purpose is to test the HMM con-
struction algorithm [93] and provide readers simple illustrations of the concept of model confidence.
Two examples are given in this section. We will delve into the details of applying the proposed
algorithm of determining the model confidence in the protocol detection of the Tor network in the
next chapter.
3.6.1 Example 1
The HMM used to generate the observation sequence of Example 1 is shown in Figure 3.5a.
We start with randomly choosing a start state in this model. At each step, an outgoing transition
is taken with the associated probability and the corresponding symbol is observed. The original
process was set to generate 10,000 symbols of data. The HMM generated using the model inference
algorithm introduced in Section 3.3.2 is shown in Figure 3.5b. We can see that the reconstructed
model has the same state structure and almost the same transition probabilities as the original






































































Figure 3.6: Example 2: (a) Original model; (b) Model constructed from 10,000 symbols; (b) Model
constructed from 100,000 symbols.
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3.6.2 Example 2
The same steps were applied to the Markov chain in Figure 3.6a as was done in Example
1. The model constructed from the first 10,000 observations is shown in Figure 3.6b. In this case,
the state structure of model is different from the original model as state 4 has not been visited once
with the first 10,000 observations. However, with more data collected, the state structure of the
reconstructed model using 100,000 observations is the same as the original model. Furthermore, the
transition probabilities are also closer to the actual values.
The results of both examples illustrate the point made earlier. If an insufficient amount
of data samples are used, the algorithm only creates a model that only represents the data used
to generate it, rather than the underlying process. This is what makes the difference in the state
structure and the transition probabilities. As indicated by Equation (5.34), the probability of not
seeing a transition decreases as our observation time increases. To build a model representing the
underlying process, there must be enough data samples available in the training set to fully describe
that process.
3.7 Summary
In this work, we explained an issue that arises when constructing or training a class of
HMMs from observation data, which is how to ensure that it accurately represents both the data
used to train the model and the underlying process. We use the statistics of the process to calculate
an upper bound on the number of samples required to guarantee that the model has a given level
significance. In other words, we have shown how to determine within a given level of statistical
confidence if a “known unknown” transition does not occur given two user-defined thresholds ǫ and
α as introduced in Section 3.4. The parameter ǫ determines the minimum probability that transitions
with probabilities no less than ǫ should be included in the constructed model. The parameter α
is the confidence level that shows the accuracy of the model result. In our demonstrations of the





Now we apply the model confidence approach presented in the previous chapter to inferring
the protocol a sender uses when he talks to a client through Tor network by collecting the inter-packet
timings on the client. The time between sending each packet depends on the symbol associated with
the transition. Each symbol is assigned a specified time delay in milliseconds and the server waits
that amount of time before sending the packet to the client. This technique relates the inter-packet
delays to transitions of the HMM. In other words, the time delays between successive packets will
be our observations of the underlying process. This is the behavior we expect in real protocols, that
the packet times will be related to processing required by a specific task in the process.
4.1 Tor
As one of the most popular anonymity systems in use today, Tor is a low-latency overlay
network the allows applications to communicate anonymously and securely on the Internet. An
overlay network is a logical network interconnected by virtual circuits on top of physical network.
The links that connect the individual systems in the overlay network are implemented as “tunnels”
through the underlying network. The packets sent over are multiply encrypted so that they stay
logically separated from regular traffic. Tor’s stability and deployment breadth can be attributed to
its practical design [8, 35, 37, 39, 40, 85, 94].
Tor primarily consists of computers hosting two types of services: relay and directory server.
There are several thousands of relays, also known as onion routers run on a voluntary basis by
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individuals and organizations worldwide. The path through Tor is constructed from the relays.
Relays and clients communicate over the directory protocol [67] to exchange directory information.
By default, relays listen on TCP port 9001 for incoming requests. The active relays publish their
router descriptors to a list of predefined directory servers (authorities), reporting their current status.
The directory servers store the router descriptors about a list of relays and continuously verify the
availability of these relays. Furthermore, various flags are assigned to each relay according to their
knowledge about the network status, i.e., which ones to list as running, valid, stable, etc. The
directory servers exchange their views amongst each other on the network on a regular base, e.g.,
every hour. After the servers all agree on a list of available relays, called network status consensus,
the consensus is published on a TCP port (9030 by default) and available for downloading.
To use Tor, the client will need an HTTP proxy to fetch the Tor directory and HTTPS
proxy to get relays. Current version of Tor allows the client to use any HTTPS or SOCKS proxy
to access the Tor network. After having Tor installed, one can initiate as an onion proxy (OP) if it
only handles local requests. A SOCKS proxy listens on port 9050 by default for streams generated
by TCP-based applications, such as web browsing, SSH, instant messaging, etc. The traffic will then
be routed through Tor.
Tor begins to build circuits as soon as it has enough directory information. When an
application stream arrives, it will be attached to an pre-built circuit if there is any, or wait until
a circuit is available. Before building the circuit, the client chooses all the relays (3 by default) to
use starting with the exit node. The entry node of the circuit has to be one of the entry guards,
which are a set of nodes used by the client as long-term entry points into Tor. The connection
between the client and the entry node is firstly established using the TLS/SSLv3 for authentication
and encryption [67]. After the first connection is created, the path is extended out to the second and
then third node similarly. Using this incremental path-building design, the client sets up session keys
with each successive node independently [38]. The last node of the circuit, knowns as the exit node,
is selected to ensure at best it will support the connections to the destination. Before attaching a
stream to a built circuit that might support the client’s request, Tor will send a test request. If the
request does not complete, Tor will send an error to the user.
All traffic flowing down the circuit is packed up into cells of 512 bytes, which is an effective
measure against packet size information being leaked through side channels. These cells are then








  Bob ! Node 1 
********* 
  ********* 
  ********* 
   Node 1 ! Node 2 
********* 
 ********* 
 Node 2 ! Node 3 
*********   Node 3 ! Alice 
Figure 4.1: A Tor cell that originated from Bob, destined for Alice, is sent across a Tor circuit
consisting of 3 relays.
layer of the packet is encrypted using the public key of the entry node. And so on, the innermost
layer of encryption is performed through the key of the exit node. When the cell is travelling down
the circuit and arrives at each relay node, the node will “unwrap” the cell with its private key to
reveal where it should forward the decrypted cell to, like peeling away the onion skin. By doing so,
each node in the circuit only knows the upstream node and the downstream node, and is unable
to appreciate the entire panorama of the circuit. In such way, compromising a single node will not
break the anonymity.
The described procedure is illustrated in Figure 4.1. When the destination, Alice, replies
to Bobs request, the same process is followed in reverse order. There are many more details to the
process, such as encryption schemes, integrity checking, congestion handling, path selection, etc.
The detailed specification of the Tor protocol is available at [36].
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4.2 Attacks on Tor
In [75], a large amount of compromised computers, bots, that were controlled by an adver-
sary, a bot herder, could be used to run a very extensive and diverse set of relays, with which, they
could expect to capture a broad sampling of the traffic going through Tor. The results in [76] found
that, an adversary may only need 1 out of every 2000 packets to perform a successful timing attack.
This could become a serious threat to privacy, and the best path selection strategy to prevent this
was found to be the one currently in place. Because the bots are typically on low-bandwidth con-
nections, consistently choosing paths with higher available bandwidth would help users avoid botnet
relays, and reduce the incentive for bot herders to run them.
At one time however, the path selection strategy was found to be worse for anonymity. [16]
found that the Tor directory servers did not do anything to verify the bandwidth claims reported by
a relay. So by modifying the relay code to falsely report a large amount of bandwidth, an attacker
could attract a large amount of connections to themselves and gain a higher probability of seeing each
circuit. The path selection technique was kept, but mitigations were made to keep low-bandwidth
relays from abusing it, such as integrating reputation into directory server consensus.
In [74], traffic analysis was performed on the Tor network using a timing-based congestion
attack. The attack required an adversary to create a single hop circuit with a relay in the global Tor
network and flood it with data. Then any time the timing slowed, assuming it was due to the relay
and not the link, one could guess that the relay was processing data in a circuit. If enough relays
were observed using this technique, slow down in the flows would line up and show the attacker which
three relays were being used in a circuit. This attack was devised and orchestrated very early in
Tors history when there were only 13 nodes on the whole network. Newer research suggests however,
that with a much larger Tor network and heavier traffic that the attack is no longer possible [43].
In [55], pre-compiled catalogs of path round trip times were used with a malicious web server
to limit the degree of Tors anonymity. To collect round trip times for comparison, the attacker must
connect to servers on various subnets around the Internet and compile a latency map to those
subnets. Then, if a user could be directed to the malicious web server, they could measure how long
the packets took to go round trip to the client. The clients round trip time could be compared to
the round trip times on the latency map and a reasonable estimate could be made of 2 to 4 subnets
in which the client likely resides.
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[107, 114] used temporal and frequency domain-based correlation of the networks entrance
and exit times to attack the anonymity of mix networks like Tor. The attack was designed to take
various batching strategies used by the network into account, so only the results with no batching
apply to Tor (because Tor does not do any batching). Using just the timings, streams from the
source flowing into the mix or network of mixes are matched to streams flowing out by maximum
likelihood. This attack requires the global observation of all entrances and exits from the network.
4.3 Protocol Detection of Tor
In this section, a practical example of detection of a protocol tunnelled through Tor is
presented to illustrate a useful application value of the proposed model confidence algorithm. We
use the approach [93] introduced to infer a model of the protocol a server uses when talking to a
client through the Tor network by collecting the inter-packet timings on the client. We first have
a valid HMM that represents the protocol in use. The time between sending each packet depends
on local processing and is represented by the symbol associated with the transition. Each symbol is
assigned a time delay range in milliseconds and the server waits that amount of time before sending
the packet to the client. This technique relates the inter-packet delays to transitions of the HMM. In
other words, the time delays between successive packets will be our observations of the underlying
process. In real protocols, the packet times will be related to processing required by a specific task
in the process. After symbolizing the data we capture, the model construction algorithm is used to
create the model used by the server.
4.3.0.1 Experiment Environment
As shown in Figure 4.2, we set up a small, standalone test Tor network in our lab. This
was done so as to not disturb any nodes that were functioning as part of the live global Tor network
operating on the Internet. The network consists of sixteen total systems. All systems were running
Tor version 0.2.1.19, which was the latest stable version as of August 2009 [4]. There were two Dell
Optiplex GX260 desktops running CentOS 5, two Dell Precision 370 mini-towers running Fedora
Core 6, and twelve WebDT 166 thin clients running the lightweight Debian-based Damn Small
Linux [1]. The network is a combination of various types of systems on different platforms.
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Figure 4.3: Original five state model
The model used by the server in this experiment is the one depicted in Figure 4.3. The
server starts the process by randomly selecting a state in its model to be the start state. To send
each packet, a transition is taken from the current state and the corresponding time delay is waited
before sending a packet to the client. If there is more than one possible transition out of a state, the
transition is chosen randomly, weighted on the probability of each transition. All data collection was
done on processes sent through Tor. The tshark [5] program was used to capture packets within the
network. The difference between each successive packet time ∆t is computed. We then symbolize
the data by grouping it into ranges and assigning anything in that range a unique symbol such
as A or B. After symbolizing the data we captured, the HMM inference algorithm introduced in
Section 3.3.2 is used to create a model. We start with L = 2 and increase it as needed. We follow
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the process described by the flowchart in Figure 4.4 to create the models required by our attack.
Figure 4.4: Flowchart summarizing the model construction process
The process was configured to generate 200,000 data packets. Figure 4.5 shows the model
constructed for the first 200,000 packets. The confidence test was then run on the model. We found
that it required 20,624,750 data samples. Because the amount of required data was so large, it had
to be generated in lengths of 200,000 packets at a time. After each set of 200,000, we rebuilt the
model and ran the confidence test again.
4.3.1 Pruning Experiment
Oddly enough, the required amount of data kept increasing with each set. This is because
in a Tor connection, there are times when a circuit fails or changes, or a relay gets too busy and
delays a packet. There is some extra variable latency that affects roughly one out of every 200
packets. These glitches cause the packet to arrive later than it should have and because of that, it
is incorrectly symbolized. All of these events were very low probability, which resulted in a lower
minimum asymptotic state probability for each new set. This lower probability caused the confidence
test to increase the amount of data required.





































































































































































Figure 4.5: Model that is reconstructed from first 200,000 packets of captured data
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Figure 4.6: Plot of model confidence results as more data is captured
state probabilities to prune them out. After a model has been constructed, it may have transitions
that are taken very rarely and states that are visited very rarely. By setting a threshold on the
asymptotic state probabilities, rare transitions are trimmed from the model. The pruning process is
implemented mainly by three steps:
1. Any state with an asymptotic probability below the threshold is removed from the model.
2. All transitions going to or leaving from that state are also removed.
3. Finally, any state or set of states that cannot be reached due to a removal are also deleted.
This leaves the model with only the states and transitions for which we have enough data. When
we are unable to collect enough data to be confident in the full model, we leave out the parts where
we would need more data to achieve confidence.
The value of the probability threshold is how often we should expect the process to de-
viate from the model. The smallest asymptotic state probability and corresponding result from
the confidence test are plotted against the number of packets captured in Figure 4.6. The steady
increase suggests we will not easily capture enough data to rebuild the model confidently. As for
our experiment, analysis of the asymptotic state probabilities shows a large gap between 71 of the
states and the other eight. These 71 states have probabilities below 0.06%, while the other eight
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have probabilities above 8.2%. That is a break of over two orders of magnitude. This separation
makes a good significance level for pruning. Following the pruning process, the model in Figure 4.7













Figure 4.7: Result after pruning low-probability states and transitions
Recall that states of the inferred HMM are characterized as having same probability distri-
bution over the next output symbol. In this case it follows that node 3 and node 4 in Figure 4.7 can
be considered as the same state, and should be merged with one another. Likewise, node 5 and node
7 are merged, as well as state 2 and state 6. Note that node 6 and node 7, although both have the
same output, have to remain two separate states. Otherwise, the transition leading to the merged
state would be mapped to more that one symbol, i.e. A and B. Figure 4.8 shows the resulting













In this chapter, we described a timing side channel attack to detect the communication
protocol tunnelled through Tor. The model confidence algorithm proposed in Chapter 3 is applied
to the implementation of the attack. A practical experiment is conducted on a private Tor network.
The experimental results have demonstrated the effectiveness of the attack, as well as having proved
the practical application of the model confidence algorithm.
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Chapter 5
Optimizing Average POMDP over
Infinite-Horizon
5.1 Introduction
A POMDP is solved by finding a policy that optimizes the payoff function. In this context,
we consider the discrete-time infinite-horizon POMDPs. Most often, the payoff function for infinite-





βt · Rt (5.1)
where β ∈ [0, 1) is called the discount factor; Rt is the immediate reward of step t; vβ is the
discounted sum of immediate rewards over infinite horizon. It is desirable for vβ to converge for a
given control policy. Power series of the form as Equation (5.1) will converge as long as 0 ≤ β < 1.
A great deal of research has been devoted to infinite horizon discounted POMDPs. Analysis of those
systems is fairly mature. In our work, we consider POMDPs with a different performance criterion,














where Rρt is the immediate reward at step t from the adoption of ρ; v
ρ
α is the limiting average
reward over an infinite horizon. The agent’s goal is to find the optimal policy ρ∗ that maximizes
vρα. In turn, if the payoff function is meant to limit the average cost, the corresponding optimal
policy is defined to give the minimum cost. The long-run average performance criteria is suited for
designing cyclical control tasks [21, 66, 101]. In the sequel we will abbreviate the phrase “POMDP
with limiting average performance criterion” to “average POMDP”. Few attempts have been made
to solve average POMDPs since the optimal solution may not exist. Yu shows in [110] that an ǫ-
optimal policy exists if the optimal limsup (liminf for minimum cost) average reward of the POMDP
is constant. A policy ρ∗ of a maximization problem is said to be ǫ-optimal if
sup vρα + ǫ ≤ sup vρ
∗
α , ∀ρ ∈ P (5.3)
We assume the underlying MDP are irreducible and restrict ourselves to stationary policies.
That is, the expected reward is constant and does not depend on the initial belief. According to
Yu [110], there exists an ǫ-optimal policy.
Based on the assumption of irreducibility, We develop several average POMDP solution
techniques that require neither a priori information, nor belief update, while still converging. The
first method uses the HMM inference approach from [93] to create an observable model of the original
POMDP problem from process observations. We then determine our control policy by analyzing the
system subspace. This approach will not suffer from the drawbacks of the current methods that are
mainly caused by complicated belief updating and require much less computation at run-time.
The second POMDP algorithm proposed in this work, which falls into the category of
policy-based solution approaches [23] is to restrict the analysis to a particular set of policies and
search for the optimal course of action within that restricted set. A widely used method is to
restrict search to stationary policies using finite observed history, where “stationary” means that
the agents’ decisions in each state are invariant with respect to time. By doing so, we rephrase
the POMDP as an “extended MDP”, by defining each state of the “extended-MDP” as a tuple
of the state of the POMDP and a finite observable history. Instead of working with the original
POMDP, we determine the optimal finite-history policy by solving the extended-MDP. While no
existing algorithms guarantees an optimality for limiting average POMDPs, experimental results
show that our approach works well in some problem domains.
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In the last approach presented in this thesis, we consider the problem of finding the optimal
finite state controller (FSC) of a given size for average POMDPs. We transform the POMDP
planning problem into a NLP problem. A wide assortment of optimization techniques can efficiently
solve large-scale NLP problems [12]. We solve NLPs using sequential quadratic programming (SQP),
which is one of the most successful methods for finding numerical solutions of NLP. The experiment
results show that a small FSC can adequately optimize the selected benchmarks. This suggests that
near-optimal approximations may be possible for large-scale problems with reasonable-size FSCs,
which indicates that our approach may be able to solve POMDPs whose size is beyond the limits of
classical methods.
5.2 Previous Work
In general, exact POMDP algorithms are computationally intractable. Although many
approximation algorithms have been proposed in the past few decades, most work is devoted to dis-
counted POMDPs. These POMDP algorithms can be grouped into value-iteration (VI) approaches
and approaches based on policy iteration (PI).
Let us first examine the basis of VI and then briefly review those point-based approximate
approaches. Value iteration is a dynamic programming approach to calculating the optimal control
policy for a POMDP [97]. A POMDP is cast as a continuous state space MDP, whose state b, known
as belief, is a probability distribution over S:
b = [b(1), b(2), · · · , b(N)]
where b(s) is the probability of being state s. Start from the value function of the last step, each
value function Vt until the first step (i.e. t = 1) is recursively built from the value function of its















T (s, a, s′)Z(a, s′, o′)α′j(s
′)b(s)] (5.4)




2, · · · , α′|Vt+1|] is a convex piecewise linear (CPWL) function consisting of a set
of α-vectors. Each α-vector α′j is a |S|-dimensional hyperplane and associated with the optimal
action of that step. In exact algorithms, the backup in (5.4) needs to be performed exhaustively in
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the continuous probability space at each step. The resulting Vt remains CPWL. In the worst case,
Vt has size |A||Vt+1||O|. An ǫ-optimal solution for an infinite-horizon discounted POMDP can be
approximated using a finite size value function for ∀ǫ > 0.
As a way to address this high complexity, approximate VI approaches (point-based VI
(PBVI) [52], Perseus [99], heuristic search VI (HSVI) [96] and point-based PI (PBPI) [57]) fix the
number of beliefs where the backup is carried out. By doing so, the size of the value function is
effectively restricted. PBVI only plans for relevant beliefs selected by sampling from reachable beliefs
while Perseus focuses on a fixed set of randomly selected beliefs points. Thus, Persues is usually
faster than PBVI, and can be naturally extended to very large problems. HSVI chooses beliefs
to update using forward exploration heuristics. This allows HSVI to generate competitive results,
but usually at the cost of high computational overhead. By using PBVI instead of exact VI in the
improvement phrase of Hansen’s PI, PBPI may produce superior performance in terms of solution
quality and computational cost.
The other technique that is widely adopted in solving POMDPs is PI. By alternating between
policy evaluation and policy improvement, Hansen’s PI [51] is guaranteed to converge to an ǫ-optimal
policy. The value function of a given policy ρ represented by a FSC, is calculated by solving the
following system of linear equations:









T (s, a, s′)Z(a, s′, o′)y(n, o′, n′)V ρn′(s
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n (s). The optimal




In the following policy improvement phrase, the FSC is augmented by a full backup according to
the Bellman optimality equation and then pruned by removing the pointwise dominated nodes. The
incoming arcs of these nodes are redirected to the nodes that dominate them. The resulting FSC
is then evaluated to update the value of each node. The size of the FSC grows very quickly as up
to |A||N ||O| nodes may be added in the improvement phrase. As a result, the exact PI algorithms
often require an intractable amount of space.
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Poupart and Boutilier proposed an approximate and efficient PI approach known as the
bounded policy iteration (BPI) [80], which incrementally increases the size of the controller. By
extending the search space to stochastic controllers, BPI solves a linear programming for each node
to maxi improve its value by optimizing its associated parameters in the policy improvement step.
This results in a smaller but higher quality controller. The algorithm monotonically converges to a
local optimum, at which point new nodes are added to escape from local optima. To further improve
the performance of BPI, a simple extension called biased BPI is proposed later [79], in which the
search for controllers is biased toward the reachable beliefs considering the initial belief.
Another gradient-based search technique of improving fixed-size stochastic FSC in intro-
duced in [70]. A cross-product MDP is formulated by combining the POMDP and the FSC. The
states of the MDP are defined as the combination of all the states of the POMDP and the states
of the controller. Matrix operations are adopted to compute the gradient of the value of the MDP,
which is then used to the search for an improved controller.
5.3 Observable Subspace Solution for Irreducible POMDPs
with Infinite Horizon
Recall that when a POMDP is presented, the core MDP is known. We start by analysing
the properties of the core MDP.
5.3.1 Irreducible MDP
Assume that the core MDP of the POMDP under consideration is irreducible. The policy
function of a MDP is ρ : S ×A −→ [0, 1] with ρ(s, a) being the probability of taking action a given
that the process is currently in state s. By assuming that every ρ determines an irreducible Markov
chain, the property of ergodicity allows us to analyse the POMDP with the average performance
criterion. Without the assumption of ergodicity, it is a senseless thing to discuss the “long-run
performance” of the decision process, especially when there exit absorbing states.
Compared with POMDP solution techniques, the algorithms for optimal decision strategies
in MDP domains are much more mature and efficient. A policy will be called pure or deterministic
if ρ ∈ {0, 1}. It has been shown that a pure optimal policy, denoted by ρ∗, exists for any completely
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ergodic MDP [45]. Given the pure optimal policy of the core MDP, we applied it to the core MDP
and studied the effect of ρ∗ over the observable portion of the POMDP. In doing so, we were able
to infer the corresponding policy based on the observable portion of the original POMDP. In other
words, we have to transform the originally unobservable MDPs into observable models in some way.
We gain a good deal of enlightenment from the HMM inference algorithm presented in [95] and
extended in [93].
5.3.2 Observable Model Construction
It is obvious that the most favorable decision atmosphere for an agent is a completely observ-
able process. We first construct the model representing the observable portion of the POMDP with
the core MDP operating optimally; then relate it to the control pattern of adopting ρ∗; and finally
approximate this desirable control pattern based on the observable model. With the knowledge of
the core MDP, the optimal policy ρ∗ of the core MDP is easily computable [45]. We simulate the
optimal decision process of the core MDP starting with a random initial state. We select the action
of each step using ρ∗ and determine the resultant state based on T . Furthermore, an observation
is generated according to Z. By running the simulation for D steps, we obtain an ordered state
sequence, as well as a concurrent observation sequence, denoted by←−s D and←−o D respectively. There
exists a one-to-one correspondence between elements of these two sequences.
Given a discrete-time, discrete valued sequence of observations, we constructed a HMM,
denoted by Γ using the approach introduced in [93]. This process eventually converged to produce
a deterministic HMM that expresses the statistics of the observation sequence with the desired
significance. This relies solely on two basic assumptions that are implied by the system being
Markovian: (i) the probability distribution of future outputs, conditional on current observation, is
stationary, and (ii) each element of the observation sequence takes values in O, which is a finite set
of observations. Although the constructed model differs in structure from the original POMDP, we
can show that it expresses the observable system produced by the POMDP and is referred to as the
observable model. The model Γ is a deterministic HMM consisting of a finite number of states and
transitions. We define the state of Γ at step t as θ(t), which is a random variable that can take on
values from the finite set Θ = {1, 2, . . . ,K} and K is the number of states in Γ. Note that in order to
differentiate between the states of the underlying MDP and the states of the constructed observable
model, we will call s ∈ S the underlying state, and k ∈ K the observable state. Figure 5.1 gives an
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Figure 5.1: Example of constructed HMM using observation sequence
illustration of an observable model built from an observation sequence with |O| = 3. The observable
model has K = 3 states. Each transition of the model is associated with an observation. Given
a state and an observation, the downstream state is uniquely determined due to the deterministic
property of the constructed HMM.
5.3.3 Observable Subspace Policy
To extract the control pattern of using ρ∗, the observable model Γ was traced through by
the state sequence ←−o D in parallel with the concurrently collected state sequence ←−s D. For each
observation, the corresponding state was assigned to the ending state of the transition marked by
that observation. At the same time, for every observable state k ∈ Γ, we counted the number of
times that the process was in each underlying state s ∈ S, denoted by wsk. With the relation
between s and a given by ρ∗, we then calculated vak, which is the number of times that action a







Now the control policy based on the observable model can be expressed as
η : Θ×A −→ [0, 1]
where η is the policy function with η(k, a) representing the probability of taking action a when the
process is in observable state k. Let ck be the number of times that state k was visited during the
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The policy η is a mixed policy. Almost all the previous control schemes of POMDP only
consider pure policies. A complete algorithm is provided in Table 5.3.1 by summing up the above
arguments.
Algorithm Description 5.3.1 – Observable Subspace Solution for Irreducible POMDPs with
Infinite Horizon (OSSA)
Input: Irreducible POMDP < S,A,R,O, P,Q >; optimal pure policy ρ∗; Observation sequence
←−o D of length D; State sequence ←−s D; Confidence level α;
1. Find the optimal control policy ρ∗ of the core MDP;
2. Determine the number of observations required to construct the observable model D based on
the given confidence level α;
3. Collect the observation sequence ←−o D = {o1, o2, . . . , ot, ot+1, . . . , oD} during the implementa-
tion of ρ∗, as well as the state sequence of the core MDP ←−s D = {s1, s2, . . . , st, st+1, . . . , sD};
4. Construct the observable model Γ from ←−o D using the zero-knowledge HMM inference algo-
rithm;
5. Count ck and ws
k while tracing through Γ by ←−o D and ←−o D in parallel;
6. Use Equation 5.5 to calculate va
k;
7. Use Equation 5.6 to determine the control policy η.
The proposed approach can be divided into two steps: model construction and policy infer-
ence. In accordance with the HMM inference algorithm, the computational complexity of observable
model construction is O(|O|L+1)+ O(N), where |O| is the size of the observation space and N is the
length of input observation sequence [93]. The computing overhead of policy inference is in effect
introduced by the process of traversing the model, and is determined by the length of the input
sequence, which is O(N). Therefore, the overall computational complexity of the OSSA algorithm
is O(|O|L+1)+ O(N).
5.3.4 Experimental Results
We tested the proposed approach on several completely ergodic POMDP examples. To
illustrate the performance of our algorithm, we also provide the results of using the well-known
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PBVI algorithm – Perseus PBVI, and the “real” optimum value of the core MDP. The example
problems are given as follows.
Example 1: 2s-2o-2a pomdp
































Example 2: 3s-3o-2a POMDP





































Example 3: 3s-3o-3a POMDP



















































We operate the core MDP of each example using the corresponding optimal policy ρ∗. An
observation is generated at each step according to the observation probabilities Qas×o during the
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operation. For each example problem, an observation sequence of 50000 symbols was collected and
injected into the HMM inference method. The generated HMMs of the examples are illustrated in
Figure 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.




Table 5.1: The state transition probability matrix of example 2s2o2a-POMDP
Figure 5.3: The constructed observable model of example 3s3o2a-POMDP
Table 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 shows the simulation results of adopting our algorithm (OSSA) and
several other control schemes. The analysis was carried out by comparing two parameters: average
reward andf run-time. In addition to PBVI, we also provide the optimum long-run average rewards
of the corresponding MDPs. As mentioned earlier, almost all the previous control schemes only
consider pure policy. Each average reward was computed over 10000 steps. We can set the running
time limit for PBVI to be 1500s because the computed control scheme is guaranteed not to vary
after that. The control policy generated by Perseus PBVI usually converges on one action (2s-2o-2a
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S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
S1 0.2121 0.4869 0.3009 0 0
S2 0 0 0.2842 0.2898 0.4260
S3 0.1470 0.6227 0.2303 0 0
S4 0.1859 0.3368 0.4772 0 0
S5 0 0 0 0.2499 0.3896
Table 5.2: The state transition probability matrix of example 3s3o2a-POMDP
Figure 5.4: The constructed observable model of example 3s3o3a-POMDP
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
S1 0 0.5236 0.2351 0 0 0 0.2413
S2 0 0 0.2585 0.3097 0.4318 0 0
S3 0.1470 0.6227 0.2303 0 0 0 0
S4 0 0 0.4773 0 0.2491 0.3368 0
S5 0 0 0.3479 0.2491 0.4030 0 0
S6 0 0.4611 0.3582 0 0 0.1807 0
S7 0 0.3669 0.0.4395 0 0 0.1937 0
Table 5.3: The state transition probability matrix of example 3s3o3a-POMDP
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and 3s-3o-2a), or several actions taken in turn (3s3o3a). In either case the controller is provided
with a pure policy given the observation of last step. Based on this consideration, we test all the












Perseus PBVI 1.9978 1500
MDP 6.0378 n.a.
Table 5.4: Multi-algorithm performance comparison
5.3.5 Result Analysis
As was mentioned earlier, the proposed approach does not require a priori knowledge and
yields a predictable result. We measure the difference between our policy η and ρ∗. At each step
t, we estimate the probability distribution over the MDP states based on the current state θ(t) of
the observable model Γ. We use δ(k, s) to represent our estimate of state θ(t) = k with respect to
MDP state s, i.e. the probability of being MDP state s given θ(t) = k. With the notation we have




As an estimate, there is inevitable deviation between δ(k, s) and the actual probability of
being state s given θ(t) = k. To measure the difference, we apply η to the POMDP and record the
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where φ(s, k) is the actual value of the probability. We then introduce the following expression to





[πs · (δ(s, k)− φ(s, k))2] (5.7)
where πs is the proportion of times that state s being visited and ERRk represents the difference
between our estimate of the MDP state and the true value. We provide the analysis results of
Example 2 using Equation (5.7).
δ(s = 1, k = 1) = 0.1793 δ(s = 2, k = 1) = 0.8207
δ(s = 1, k = 2) = 0.7922 δ(s = 2, k = 2) = 0.2078
φ(s = 1, k = 1) = 0.1729 φ(s = 2, k = 1) = 0.8271
φ(s = 1, k = 2) = 0.7489 φ(s = 2, k = 2) = 0.2511
π1 = 0.4851, π2 = 0.5149, ERR = 0.0444
The errors of other examples can be calculated similarly.
5.3.6 Summary
It must be noted that our approach does not necessarily given better results than conven-
tional approaches. The main idea is to extract the control pattern of ρ∗ based on the observable
system. The optimality of our method is based on the assumption that the extracted pattern is also
suitable for the partially observable situation, which may not always be the case. In a completely
observable MDP, the agent can fully concentrate on optimizing the payoff function without worrying
about the need for exploring the state of the current state. In other words, the only objective is
to the maximize the benefits of exploitation without any need for exploration. But this is not the
case in the optimization problem in a partially observable circumstance, in which the agent needs
to balance between exploitation and exploitation. A simple example [26] termed “LocateTiger” will
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server to illustrate the point.
Consider the scenario in which the agent is standing in front of two closed doors. Behind
one of the doors is a tiger while behind the other door is a reward. The agent chooses one door
to open at each step. If the door with a tiger behind is chosen, the agent would suffer a big loss
−100. Otherwise, the agent would receive a reward +10. Whichever door is selected, the tiger will
be randomly relocated in the next step. In addition to opening either door, one more alternative is
provided – “listen”, which would provide the agent some information about the position of the tiger
at a minor cost −1. Note that, if the agent chooses to listen the tiger would not be replaced in the
next step. Assume the agent plays the game for multiple steps with the purpose of maximizing the
average reward he gains, the problem can be modelled as a MDP, and the state space and action
space are
S = {L,R}, A = {L,R,LIS}
where s = L/R ∈ S means that tiger is behind the left/right door; a = L/R ∈ A represents the
action of opening the left/right door; and a = LIST denotes the action of listen. Given that the
state, i.e., the location of the tiger, is known, the agent will always choose the door with reward
inside it and consequentially get a reward at each step. The Markov chain expressing the state
transitions under the optimal control is illustrated in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Markov chain defined by the optimal control of the LocateTiger MDP
Unfortunately, the reality is that the agent has to make decisions without complete situation
awareness. To make suitable to this change, the aforementioned MDP model needs to be recast as
a POMDP. For understandability’s sake, the observation probabilities are given in Table 5.5.
The optimal policy graph of the POMDP “LocateTiger” is given in [26]. Without doubt
“listen” is included in the optimal control policy. The example would given readers some intuition
of the favourable conditions for the proposed approach. The exact conditions would be discussed in
65
Qa=Ls×o o = L o = R
s = L 0.5 0.5
s = R 0.5 0.5
(a) Observation probabilities of
a = L
Qa=Rs×o o = L o = R
s = L 0.5 0.5
s = R 0.5 0.5
(b) Observation probabilities of
a = R
Qa=LISs×o o = L o = R
s = L 0.85 0.15
s = R 0.15 0.85
(c) Observation probabilities of a =
LISTEN
Table 5.5: Observation probabilities of the POMDP “LocateTiger”
future research.
We solve for the optimal policy based on the observable MDP rather than using the original
POMDP, using techniques form [45]. This gets rid of reliance on the belief update function. We use
the set of observations to keep track of our state. In the worst case, our policy decision at run-time
requires following a PDF.
Our HMMs have properties that are desirable for control systems:
• Our HHM finite state representation is deterministic; so the Markov process is observable,
• Our inference methods require few basic assumptions and no a priori information,
• Instead of using maximum likelihood techniques for detection, we get low false negative rates
by using statistical hypothesis testing.
The proposed method should work better than the existing method in cases in which a
reliable initial belief is not available. If the current method starts off with perfect a priori belief
vector, then it is likely to have a better initial set of returns. Otherwise, our approach should have
better asymptotic payoffs. We will determine the set of POMDPS for which each approach performs
better in future work. Our approach can also be extended to solving two-person stochastic games.
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5.4 Optimizing Finite-history Policies for Infinite Horizon
Average POMDPs
In this section we still consider discrete-time, infinite-horizon POMDPs with limiting average
reward performance criterion. We assume the underlying MDPs are irreducible but restrict ourselves
to stationary policies using finite memory. We prove asymptotic convergence is assured by our
polices. An optimal solution considering a fixed amount of history can be obtained by transforming
the POMDP optimization problem into a nonlinear programming (NLP) problem, or rather, a
quadratically constrained linear programming (QCLP) problem. Simulation results for a set of
benchmark problems illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
5.4.1 Linear Programming (LP) Solution for MDPs
The stationary policy f of an MDP is an N×M matrix whose element fsa is the probability
that the controller chooses action a in state s. The controller’s decision in state s is invariant with
respect to time, i.e. the policy is stationary. A stationary policy f defines a probability transition





T (s, a, s′) · fsa (5.8)
This defines the one-step transition probability matrix Pf . If we let P
(n)
f denote the matrix of n-step
transition probabilities, using the Champman-Kolmogorov equations, and multiplying the matrix Pf
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where πs, s = 1, 2, · · · , N are asymptotic probabilities. We write πs, s = 1, 2, · · · , N as a row vector
π = [π1, π2, · · · , πN ] [89].
The policy f0, is average optimal if it maximizes the limiting average reward of the operating
process. Conversely, if the payoff function is the limiting average cost, defined to be the negative
reward, the best policy would be chosen to give the minimum payoff. Given a stationary policy f ,
we calculate the asymptotic probability vector π. For each s ∈ S, define
πsa = πs · fsa
We call πsa the long-run frequency of the state-action (sta-act) pair (s, a), induced by policy f . We






πsa · r(s, a) (5.10)













(iii)0 ≤ πsa ≤ 1
(5.11)













0 ≤ πsa ≤ 1
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, ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A (5.12)
Note that the optimal payoff of MDPs does not depend on the initial state.
5.4.2 Extended MDP
Let u = (a, o) ∈ A × O be an act-ob pair with a being the action taken at the time step





= {(At−L, Ot−L+1), · · · , (At−1, Ot)} should be read as the last L observed act-ob pairs
till time t.
Definition 2. Given a POMDP {S,A, R, T,O, Z} and a value L, with a new state space
Θ = {(uL, s)|∀ uL ∈ (A×O)L, ∀s ∈ S} (5.13)




, St} denote the state of an extended MDP at time t. For any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and a ∈ A,
we assume Q(θ, a, θ′) = Pr{Θt+1 = θ′|Θt = θ, At = a} denotes the corresponding state transition
probability. We call the 4-element tuple {Θ,A,R, Q} an extended MDP of size L.
Definition 3. For every θ = (uL, s) ∈ Θ, say θ′ = (u′L, s′) is a successor of θ, if u′L is obtained
by having uL shift to the right by one act-ob pair. That is, the first (L−1) act-ob pairs of u′L match
the last (L− 1) act-ob pairs of uL.
Theorem 1. For any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and a ∈ A,












T (s, a, s′) · Z(a, s′, o′), if θ′ is a successor of θ
0, otherwise
(5.14)
Proof. Consider the original POMDP, the Markov property ensures that the value of T (s, a, s′) only
depends on the current state s and action a. For any uL ∈ (A×O)L, we may thus write




= uL, St = s, At = a}
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for t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Since the process is conditionally stationary, we accordingly drop the subscripts
and have
T (s, a, s′) = Pr{s′|uL, s, a}
Similarly,
Z(a, s′, o′) = Pr{o′|uL, s, a, s′}
Therefore,
T (s, a, s′) · Z(a, s′, o′) = Pr{s′|uL, s, a} · Pr{o′|uL, s, a, s′} (5.15)
where Pr{o′|uL, s, a, s′} is given by
Pr{o′|uL, s, a, s′}
=
Pr{uL, s, a, s′, o′}
Pr{uL, s, a, s′}
=
Pr{uL, s, a, s′, o′}
Pr{uL, s, a} ·
Pr{uL, s, a}
Pr{uL, s, a, s′}
=
Pr{s′, o′|uL, s, a}
Pr{s′|uL, s, a}
Consequently, equation (5.15) can be written as
T (s, a, s′) · Z(a, s′, o′) = Pr{s′|uL, s, a} · Pr{s
′, o′|uL, s, a}
Pr{s′|uL, s, a} = Pr{s
′, o′|uL, s, a} (5.16)
Let θ′ be the successor of θ, whose end act-ob pair is (a, o′), we obtain from (5.38) that
T (s, a, s′) · Z(a, s′, o′) = Pr{θ′|θ, a} = Q(θ, a, θ′) (5.17)
On the contrary, if θ′ is not a successor of θ, the continuity in the act-ob sequence determines θ
cannot be immediately followed by θ′, in which case
Pr{θ′|θ, a} = 0 (5.18)
This completes the proof.
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5.4.3 Policies for Extended MDPs
Note that the extended MDP is in effect another way of describing the model, and is
completely equivalent to the original POMDP. It follows that an optimal policy for the POMDP
is also optimal for the extended MDP, and vice versa. As is mentioned before, we only consider
stationary policies of a finite amount of observed history. Given L, the length of history considered
for the decision making course, we show that the corresponding extended MDP provides a way to
evaluate this particular class of POMDP policies.
If we use the notation fe = (fe(θ, a))θ∈Θ,a∈A to denote the policy of the extended MDP,
each entry of fe is defined by
fe(θ, a) = Pr{At = a|Θt = θ}, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
Given that fe is a stationary policy, dropping the subscripts yields
fe(θ, a) = Pr{a|θ}, ∀θ ∈ Θ
To apply fe, the controller should always know the state s of the underlying process, which is
not the case due to partial observability. Therefore, this optimal policy is generally not feasible.
One way to address the problem is to remove the unobservable parts of the model and map the
action distributions to the observable parts. It follows that the POMDP policies can be expressed
as probability distributions over actions conditioning on the last L act-ob pairs. In particular, a
POMDP policy
gL = (g(uL)), ∀uL ∈ (A×O)L (5.19)
is a matrix, where g(uL) is a column vector with entries that satisfy
∑
a∈A g(u
L, a) = 1. Each entry
g(uL, a) is interpreted as the probability of taking action a given that uL is observed. The definition
of the POMDP policy determines that at each step g(uL, a) does not depend on the current state
of the POMDP. That is
g(uL, a) = g(θ = (uL, s), a), ∀s ∈ S
Or, equivalently, if uL is fixed, the probability distribution of a conditioning on Θt = (u
L, s) are
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equal to each other for ∀s ∈ S.
fe(θ = (u
L, s), a) = fe(θ = (u
L, s′), a), ∀s, s′ ∈ S (5.20)
We now have shown that the POMDP control policy gL can be regarded as a well defined
policy fe of the equivalent extended MDP as shown in (5.20). We can therefore seek the optimal g
L
by optimizing the extended MDP of size L under the constraints in (5.20).
5.4.4 Extended MDP with Average Payoff Criterion
We assume the core MDP of the POMDP under consideration is irreducible, or completely
ergodic, for any policy. Ergodicity lets us analyze the POMDP with the average performance
criterion.
5.4.4.1 Approach I
Defining the POMDP as an extended MDP allows us to apply classical MDP approaches to


















πθa ≥ 0, for ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀a ∈ A.
Additional constraints are included as a result of the restrictions imposed on fe in (5.20). Us-










, ∀s, s′ ∈ S
72
where θs = (u





πθs′a = πθs′a ·
∑
a∈A
πθsa, ∀s, s′ ∈ S (5.21)






















πθs′a = πθs′a ·
∑
a∈A
πθsa, ∀s, s′ ∈ S, a ∈ A, (a, o)L ∈ (A×O)L.
(5.22)
Equation (5.22) describes the NLP which defines an optimal controller of size L. The last constraint
ensures the implementability of the obtained policy.
5.4.4.2 Approach II
In this section, we give another means for optimizing the average extended MDP. This
algorithm involves two sets of decision variables: the asymptotic state probabilities and the action
selection probabilities (gL).
Theorem 2. Given a POMDP {S,A, R, T,O, Z}, for any control policy gL of length L as defined




, St, At)} ∈ Φ, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , where
Φ , {(uL−1, s, a)|uL−1 ∈ (A×O)L−1, s ∈ S, a ∈ A} (5.23)
A Markov chain is formed over state space Φ. For any φ = (uL−1, s, a) ∈ Φ, consider φ′ =
{u′L−1, s′, a′} where u′L−1 represents a succession of uL−1, the transition probability of going from
φ to φ′, denoted by Xφφ′ is given by
Pr{φ′|φ} , Xφφ′ = T (s, a, a′) · Z(a, s′, o) · g(u′L, a′) (5.24)
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Proof. By substituting (L− 1) for L in (5.38), we obtain
T (s, a, a′) · Z(a, s′, o) = Pr{u′L−1, s′|uL−1, s, a} (5.25)
It thus follows that
T (s, a, s′) · Z(a, s′, o) · g(uL, a′)
= Pr{s′, o′|uL−1, s, a} · g(u′L, a′)
(5.26)
Since g(uL, a′) is irrelevant to current state, we write
g(uL, a′) = Pr{a′|u′L−1, a, o′} = Pr{a′|uL−1, s, a, s′, o′} (5.27)
Upon using (5.27), it follows from (5.39) that
T (s, a, a′) · Z(a, s′, o) · g(uL, a′)
= Pr{s′, o′|uL−1, s, a} · Pr{a′|uL−1, s, a, s′, o′}
= Pr{s′, o′|uL−1, s, a} · Pr{s
′, o′, a′|uL−1, s, a}
Pr{s′, o′|uL−1, s, a}
= Pr{s′, o′, a′|uL−1, s, a}
= Pr{u′L−1, s′, a′|uL−1, s, a}
(5.28)
This completes the proof.
Given a POMDP and an implementable policy gL, according to Theorem 2, the process
operates as a Makrov chain. Let πφ, where φ ∈ Φ = (A×O)L−1 denote the asymptotic probabilities
of the Markov chain, we can express the expected long-run average reward as
∑
φ∈Φ
πφ · r(s, a) (5.29)













πφ′ · T (s, a, a′) · Z(a, s′, o) · g(u′
L





Conditional probabilities, g(uL, a) must satisfy
0 ≥ g(uL, a) ≥ 1, for ∀uL ∈ (A×O)L−1, ∀a ∈ A,
∑
a∈A
g(uL, a) = 1, for ∀uL ∈ (A×O)L−1
(5.31)














0 ≥ g(uL, a) ≥ 1, for ∀uL ∈ (A×O)L−1, ∀a ∈ A,
∑
a∈A
g(uL, a) = 1, for ∀uL ∈ (A×O)L−1
(5.32)
Just like (5.22), the formulation in (5.32) also has a linear objective function, but contains quadratic
constraints. The difference is that (5.32) has more variables but fewer nonlinear constraints. Overall,
the two optimization schemes in (5.22) and (5.32) are essentially the same, as well as the computa-
tional costs.
5.4.5 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate our approach using a set of benchmark problems: 2s2a2o [111],
Tiger [31], DAS (Distributed Agent System) [28], Paint [29], Bridge [27] and Shuttle [30]. These
domains are frequently used benchmarks for POMDP algorithms. In the interest of saving space, we
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omit the details of these problems. For detailed information of these problems, we refer to [27–31].
For our experiment, we used an optimization solver called “fmincon” provided by Matlab to solve
the NLP problems. “fmincon” has four algorithm options [68]. We chose SQP. All the computation
was performed on a Intel Core 2 DUO E8400 3.00 GHz computer. The experiment results using
the proposed method are divided into two groups and compared to two different POMDP solution
techniques, respectively.
5.4.5.1 NLP v.s. Perseus PBVI
Gourp I consists of three domains: 2s2a2o, Tiger and DAS. We also employed the Perseus
point-based value iteration (PBVI) algorithm to solve these problem. Perseus PBVI is a one of
the leading POMDP approximation techniques [99] and has been shown very efficient for discrete
POMDPs. We used the Matlab program provided at [98] to implement the Perseus algorithm.
The limiting average performance was considered by letting the discount factor γ = 1 and having
the program iterate for a significant amount of steps. A summary of our results, comparing our
algorithm to Perseus can be found in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Results for second group of POMDP problems.
Problem
NLP Perseus PBVI
L A. P. A. P. (Simulated) Time(s) A. P. (Simulated) Time(s)
2s2a2o(max) 2 10.1454 10.1467 8 8.5025 300
Tiger(max) 3 1.0381 1.0636 3277 -1.0000 300
DAS(max) 2 0.1228 0.1368 1578.2 -9.98 300
1 “max” means to maximize the long-run average reward.
Table 5.6 shows the computed maximum average rewards (A. P.), i.e. the numerical so-
lutions of the NLPs and the simulated payoffs of the obtained policies (A. P. (Simulated)). All
simulated results of NLP are averaged over 50000 steps. The computation time for both algorithms
are also given. All the experiments using Perseus PBVI are configured to run 300s to ensure the
convergence of the algorithm. The results show that in these problems our algorithm displays bet-
ter control quality than Perseus PBVI at the expense of more computation time. The results of
the first Time(s) column in Table 5.6 are the time taken for the NLP algorithm to terminate,
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which is actually much longer than necessary to find the approximate optimal solution. As shown
in Figures 5.6(a)− (c), the value functions vary very little after the first few iterations. Hence, the
algorithm can be considered already converged long before it actually terminates. Controllers can
choose according to their their own needs for optimality.
5.4.5.2 NLP v.s. Discretized Approximation Algorithm
The other three problems, Paint [29], Bridge [27] and Shuttle form Group II. To give readers
a better idea about what conditions does POMDP apply, a description of some benchmark problems
is given in Appendix A. We chose these problems because they were used by Yu in her paper [109]
to show the effectiveness of the DA algorithm. Table 5.7 compares our method’s performance with
the results of DA algorithm published in [109], in which the computational time is not given. In
all domains of the Group II, our approach achieves competitive performance in terms of solution
quality. The convergence processes of the problems of Group II are shown in Figure 5.6(c) − (d).
The computation time of NLP could be reduced by loosening the stop criteria of the SQP solver.
Table 5.7: Results for first set of POMDP problems.
Problem
NLP DA Algorithm
L A. P. A. P. (Simulated) Time(s) A. P. (Simulated)
Paint(max) 2 0.5000 0.5039 5917 -0.170
Bridge(min) 1 5.3457 5.4123 5970 241.798
Shuttle(max) 1 1.7147 1.7154 646.65 -1.842
1 “max” means to maximize the limiting average reward while “min” means to minimize the
limiting average cost.
The comparison of the two groups shows that the our approach is able to find a good policy
in many cases. The time taken to generate these solutions mainly depends on the size of the problem,
i.e. number of states, actions and observations, and the value of L.
5.4.6 Summary
In this section, we consider stationary policies for discrete infinite-horizon irreducible POMDPs
with limiting average performance criterion, which only base the decisions on a finite amount of
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The maximum value is 10.1454
(a) The convergence behavior of “2s2a2o”.






















The maximum value is 1.0381
(b) The convergence behavior of “Tiger”.
Figure 5.6: The convergence behaviors of the example problems.
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The maximum value is 0.1228
(c) The convergence behavior of “DAS”.























The maximum value is 0.5000
(d) The convergence behavior of “Paint”.
Figure 5.6: The convergence behaviors of the example problems.
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The minimum value is 5.3457
(e) The convergence behavior of “Bridge”.























The maximum value is 1.7147
(f) The convergence behavior of “Shuttle”.
Figure 5.6: The convergence behaviors of the example problems.
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memory, i.e. previous actions and observations. We have introduced two schemes, both of which
formulate the original POMDP as a NLP problem. Given a POMDP problem and a stationary
policy of fixed length L, the first scheme recast the POMDP as an extended MDP, with each state
defiend as a 2-tuple consisting of the last L observable histories and the current underlying state
of the POMDP. The extended MDP covers all the information of the POMDP, as well as the pol-
icy, and allows us to solve the POMDP in the manner analogous to solving regular MDPs. The
second scheme, while similar to the first scheme, views the implementation of the stationary policy
to POMDP as a Markov chain. We can easily calculate an expected reward for each state of the
Markov chain and write the limiting average reward, independent of the starting state, as the lin-
ear combination of the immediate rewards. In both schemes, to ensure these stationary values are
correct given the state transition and action selection probabilities, quadratic constraints must be
added and result in a NLP. Linear constraints are used to maintain the proper probabilities.
With our formulation, the evaluation of any stationary policy is straightforward. The ex-
periment results of the Tiger problem show that increasing L may improve the control performance.
Although the existence of optimal policies is still an open problem for POMDPs with average perfor-
mance criterion, if a finite optimal stationary policy exists, it should be found by gradually increasing
L, and if it does not, it still can be approximated arbitrarily closely by increasing L. We performed
experiments in some benchmark problems, and our approach turns out to be very competitive with
some of the leading techniques in terms of solution quality.
A stationary policy can be represented by a tree diagram. At each node, there are |A|
choices of actions; then, the observation received determines the branch to follow. A policy tree
of height L contains |A|L+1|O|L decision variables and results in |A|L|O|L−1|S| asymptotic state
probabilities for the formed Markov chain of the second scheme. If we use the number of variables
to measure the size of the NLPs, it follows that for the size of the NLP of the second scheme is
|A|L+1|O|L + |A|L|O|L−1|S| (5.33)
This value exposes the bottleneck of the proposed method, which is the solution of a NLP whose
size is rigidly related to the size of the POMDP (including |S|, |A| and |O|) and grows exponentially
with the desired length of observed history to consider. This problem can be greatly mitigated by
introducing the finite state controller (FSC) [71]. The size of the NLP then corresponds to the
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choice of an appropriate size of FSC. It is worth noting that the introduction of the finite state
controllers will enlarge the policy space, which is no longer confined to stationary polices. Another
workable method to break the bottle requires better understanding of the optimization techniques.
Our formulation in (5.32) belongs to a specific class of NLP problems, which are quadratically
constrained linear programming problems. We are currently working on an optimization solver
specifically designed for this type of problems.
Finally, we have already started to integrate our formulation into problems of multiple agents
modelled as decentralized POMDPs. The policy iteration techniques have already been generalized
successfully to the multi-agent case. We are confident that our experiments will verify the NLP
approach will compare favorably with other POMDP approximation techniques.
5.5 Fixed-size Finite-state Controllers for POMDPs with Av-
erage Performance Criterion
The third approach is also a policy-based algorithm. The difference is that we extend the
search cope to the space of FSCs.
5.5.1 The Proposed Algorithm
Our approach only requires one input: the size of the FSC (|N |). A nice feature of a
POMDP given a FSC is that, the sequence generated by the joint process 〈Nt, St〉 constitutes a
Markov chain [70]. A similar conclusion also applies with FSCs as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Given a POMDP, under any given FSC, the sequence of node-state-action triplets




′, s′, a′|n, s, a) =
∑
o∈O
T (s, a, s′)Z(a, s′, o)x(n, a)y(n, o, n′) (5.34)
We assume that the optimal Markov chain, i.e., the one with the maximum average reward,
is ergodic. That is, the expected reward is constant and does not depend on the initial belief.
According to Yu [110], there exists an ǫ-optimal policy. Since any policy can be represented by a
FSC [23], this ensures the existence of an ǫ-optimal FSC. We are now in the position to propose the
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NLP formulation from Theorem 3. Let πnsa be the asymptotic probabilities of the Markov chain



























Along with (5.34), we can see the first constraint in (5.36) is a cubic equation in terms of x, y and
πnsa. To reduce the complexity, we define
g(n, a, o′, n′) , Pr(n′, a′|n, o′) = y(n, o′, n′)x(n′, a′) (5.37)






T (s, a, s′)Z(a, s′, o)g(n, o′, n′, a′) (5.38)











T (s, a, s)Z(a, s′, o′)g(n, o′, n′, a′), ∀n′ ∈ N , ∀s′ ∈ S, ∀a′ ∈ A (5.39)
With this simplification, we now have only linear and quadratic constraints. Based on the above
analysis, we are now ready for the following important theorem.
Theorem 4. Given an ergodic POMDP, the optimal fixed-size FSC, denoted by 〈N ,A,O, x∗, y∗〉,
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πnsa · r(s, a)
where variables πnsa and g(n, o, n
















g(n, o′, n′, a′) = 1, ∀n ∈ N , ∀o′ ∈ O,
g(n, o′, n′, a′) > 0, ∀n ∈ N , ∀o′ ∈ O, ∀n′ ∈ N , ∀a′ ∈ A.
(5.40)
Let g∗ = {g∗(n, o′, n′, a′)}n∈N ,o′∈O,s′∈S,a′∈A be part of the optimal solution of the NLP in (5.40),
we can construct the corresponding optimal internal state transition probabilities y∗(n, o′, n′) by
y∗(n, o′, n′) =
∑
a′∈A
g(n, o′, n′, a′) (5.41)
and the optimal action selection probabilities x∗(n′, a′) by
x∗(n′, a′) =




We demonstrate the utility of our approach by applying it to a set of frequently used
benchmark problems for POMDP algorithm testing. In the “tag” problem [88], the goal of the
agent is to search for and tag a target moving probabilistically in a grid area. In the interest
of saving space, we omit the details of these problems. For detailed information, we refer the
reader to [27–32, 88, 111]. Table 5.8 summaries these problems and their sizes. We used the sparse
nonlinear optimizer (SNOPT) integrated in the optimization software called AIMMS to solve the
NLP problems. This solution uses the SQP method [49]. AIMMS is freely available for academic
use. All the computation was performed on a Intel Core 2 DUO E8400 3.00 GHz computer.
To illustrate the effectiveness of our approach, a summary of our results, in comparison
with the results of two other algorithms can be found in Table 5.9. Perseus PBVI is one of the
leading POMDP approximation techniques and has been shown to be very efficient for discrete
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Table 5.8: Problems and their sizes
Problem |S| |A| |O|
2s2a2o 2 2 2
Tiger 2 3 2
DAS 2 3 4
paint 4 4 2
bridge 5 12 5
shuttle 8 3 5
maze 20 6 8
hallway 60 5 21
machine maintenance 256 4 16
tag 870 5 30
tiger-grid 36 5 17
POMDPs [99]. Although less literature is available on solving POMDPs with average performance
criterion compared to the discounted counterpart, one effort worth mentioning is the lower approx-
imation scheme (LAS) proposed by Yu [110]. We also compare the performance of our approach
with the results published in [110] using the lower approximation scheme (LAS).
In Table 5.9, the columns with identifier a.r. contain the limiting average rewards computed
using different algorithms. |N | is the size of the FSC. The computation time for solving the NLPs are
given in the column labeled time(sec). All the experiments using Perseus are configured to iterate
a significant number of steps (2000 steps in our context) to ensure that the algorithm converges to
a stable value. So we also give the time taken to complete the iteration for each problem.
The experimental results show that in almost all the domains our approach achieves com-
petitive performance through the adoption of very small FSCs. The only exception is the “hallway”
problem, the maximum limiting average reward of which produced by our algorithm only achieves
67% of the reward found using Perseus PBVI. However, the optimal policy generated by Perseus
is represented by a value function consisting of 50 hyperplanes. The FSC used by our approach,
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Table 5.9: Experimental comparisons of the proposed approach with other algorithms
Problem
FSC Perseus PBVI LAS
|N | a. r. time(sec) a.r. time(sec) a.r.
2s2a2o(max) 2 10.1454 <1 8.5013 11 N/A
Tiger(max) 3 1.0838 <1 -1 13 N/A
DAS(max) 2 0.3569 <1 -9.721 21 N/A
paint(max) 2 0.17 <1 -0.0011 66 -0.172
bridge(min) 2 259 <1 2515 37 241.798
shuttle(max) 2 2.6316 <1 1.1202 224 -1.835
maze(max) 2 4.2413 <30 2.1357 766 N/A
hallway(max) 6 0.043 <100 0.064 22641 N/A
machine maintenance(max) 2 0.095 <30 0.0368 41 N/A
tag(max) 2 0 <30 -1 266 N/A
tiger-grid(max) 2 0 <30 0 2643 N/A
1 “max” means to maximize the limiting average reward while “min” means to minimize the limiting average
cost.
by contrast, only consists of 6 nodes. As a policy-based POMDP algorithm, higher optimization
quality may be attained by increasing the size of the FSC used. Unfortunately, the resulting NLP
formulation grows polynomially with the size of the FSC. The solution of large-scale NLP problems
remains a serious challenge for even state-of-the-art generic solvers. This also illustrates that no
one POMDP algorithm currently outperforms all the others in all problem domains. Which method
has better performance largely depends on the inherent structure of the problem. We are currently
examining ways to find the kind of POMDP problems for which our approach would be preferable.
The forgoing analysis, on the other hand, indicates another advantage of the proposed
approach. Our NLP-based algorithm often needs a very succinct policy, i.e., a small FSC, to achieve
a competitive optimization effect, even for some large-scale problems. In other words, our NLP-
based POMDP algorithm allows us to leverage most of what a fixed-size FSC offers in POMDP
optimization. Consider, for example, “tiger-grid” problem. While our formulation may not have a
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distinct advantage in terms of solution quality, the policy representation (|N | = 2) is much more
compact than the value function given by Perseus, which contains 20 hyperplanes.
Furthermore, it took the SNOPT solver less than one minute to find the optimal solutions,
even for some large-scale problems (maze20, hallway, tag and tiger-grid). Finally, it should also be
noted that the results of Perseus PBVI are obtained based the assumption that the initial belief
is given, which gives the Perseus PBVI a decided advantage. If the initial belief is inaccurate or
unknown, the performance may be worse than the results shown in Table 5.9. But our approach
does not require a priori knowledge and the computed results are invariant to initial beliefs.
5.5.3 Summary
We consider the discrete infinite-horizon POMDPs with limiting average performance cri-
terion and propose a policy-based POMDP algorithm. Given a POMDP and the FSC of fixed size
|N |, the joint stochastic process 〈Nt, St, At〉 form a Markov chain. Accordingly, the limiting average
reward of the POMDP, independent of the starting state, can be written as the linear combination
of the immediate rewards. To ensure these stationary values are correct given the state transi-
tion and action selection probabilities, quadratic constraints must be added yielding a NLP. Linear
constraints are used to maintain the proper probabilities.
With our formulation, the evaluation of any FSC is straightforward. Although the existence
of optimal policies is still an open problem for POMDPs with average performance criterion, the
assumption of ergodicity ensures the existence of an ǫ-optimal FSC. We performed experiments with
some benchmark problems, and our approach turns out to be very competitive with some of the
leading techniques.
From (5.40) we can see a POMDP 〈S,A,O, T, O, r〉 and a FSC of size |N | define a NLP
with |A||N |2|O| + |N ||S||A| variables and |N ||S||A| nonlinear constraints. This exposes the core
of the proposed method, which is the solution of a NLP whose size is rigidly related to the size of
the POMDP and the FSC. We can see the scalability of the proposed algorithm greatly depends
on the efficiency of the NLP solution technique. In addition to SNOPT, recently there have been
different classes and implementations of solvers for NLPs, such as SPRNLP, LOGP, etc., which
are designed for problems with many thousands of constraints and variables [48]. These powerful
solvers provide conditions for the scalability requirements of our approach, and allow us to integrate
our formulation into problems of multiple agents modelled as decentralized POMDPs. The policy
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iteration techniques have already been generalized successfully in the multi-agent case. We are
confident that our experiments will verify the NLP approach will compare favorablly with other
POMDP approximation techniques.
5.6 Summary
Three different policy-based POMDP solution techniques are explained in this chapter.
Unlike traditional policy-based approaches, neither PI nor GA is used in our methods to search
for the optimal policy. In particular, the proposed NLP-based algorithm sets up a new direction
– introducing the NLP solution techniques into optimizing average POMDPs. The performance of
these approaches is testified using a set of benchmark problems.
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Chapter 6
Distributed Scheduling for Hybrid
Security Scheme Combining IDS
and Honeypot
The main reason for combining IDSs with honeypots lies in the complementary nature of
the two technologies: IDSs passively monitor network traffic for suspicious activities, while honey-
pots proactively detect and analyze intrusions. On the other hand, what they have in common—
decentralized deployment and uncertainty in observation, explain the utility of modelling the system
as a DEC-POMDP.
6.1 Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion detection systems continuously monitor the computer system or network and gen-
erate alarms to inform the system administrator of suspicious events. IDSs are now considered a
necessary addition to the security infrastructure of an organization [92]. The objective of intrusion
detection is to detect malicious activities, and accurately differentiating them from benign activities.
According to the Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) [103], a general IDS architecture
has four modules:
• Event-box (E-box) sensors monitor and collect information about the target system.
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• Database-box (D-box) stores information from the E-box.
• Analysis-box (A-box) analyzes data stored in D-box and generates alarms if necessary.
• Response-box (R-box) implements countermeasures to thwart malicious intrusions.
The primary classes of detection methodologies include signature-based detection, anomaly-
based detection and stateful protocol analysis [92]. IDSs that employ signature-based detection
identify attacks by comparing existing signatures of known attacks with the stored network traffic.
When a match is found, IDSs will trigger the corresponding countermeasure to counteract the
detected intrusion. Signature-based detection provides accurate detection results for well-specified
attacks and effective known countermeasures can be taken. The major drawback of signature-based
detection is its inability to detect new, unknown attacks. With new attacks appearing continuously,
signature-based detection techniques suffer from high false negative (FN) rates. The anomaly-based
detection has the potential to detect new types of attacks by estimating the deviation of observed
information from the predefined baseline of “normal”. However, there still exist several significant
issues regarding anomaly-based detection, including high FP rates, low throughput but high cost,
absence of appropriate metrics, etc [47]. Stateful protocol analysis may provide more accurate
detection results than the anomaly-based detection, but is much more resource-intensive due to the
complex analysis and overhead generated from state tracking [92]. Typically, the more an IDS’s
detection accuracy can be improved from the default configuration, the less efficient it is. As a
result, continuous monitoring may cause excessive computation bandwidth, which is undesirable for
any computer system and network.
In addition, various intrusion prevention technologies have been implemented in IDSs, such
as logging off the unauthorized user, shutting down the system, or reconfiguring the network if pos-
sible [112], etc. Despite strengthening the security of the information and communication systems,
the intrusion prevention capabilities entail high cost in terms of energy and host resources.
It is not hard to see from the above introduction that, as a popular and effective tool
against cyber-attacks by guarding the system’s critical information, the resource cost of IDSs must
be taken into account. IDS scheduling is needed to balance between security performance and
resource consumption.
There are three primary types of IDS, namely network-based IDS (NIDS), host-based IDS
(HIDS) and stack-based IDS (SIDS). We choose HIDS since HIDS can be selectively deployed on
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critical machines, such as management servers, data servers and administrator consoles, etc.
6.2 Honeypot
Honeypots are needed to supplement IDSs in the proposed security scheme because they
complement most other security technologies by taking a proactive stance. A honeypot is a closely
monitored computing resource used as a trap to ensnare attackers. As defined by Spitzner in [100],
“A honeypot is a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised.”
The principal objectives of honeypots are to divert attackers away from the critical resources and
study attacker exploits to create signatures for intrusion detection. The attraction of honeypots to
attackers mitigates the threat of malicious attacks and thus helps secure the the valuable information
and important services located on the the real targets.
Based on the level of interaction between the honeypots and the attackers, honeypots can
generally be divided into the high-interaction honeypots and the low-interaction honeypots. Typical
examples are honeyd [81] and honeynet [100]. Honeyd allows users to set up multiple virtual honey-
pots with different characteristics and services on a single machine. Honeynet monitors a larger and
more diverse network when one honeypot may not be sufficient. It is very complex and expensive to
deploy and maintain a high-interaction honeypot because it emulates almost all the activities found
in a normal operating system. Deployment and configuration of a low-interaction honeypot is much
easier and cheaper since it only simulates some system services. “BitSaucer” [9] proposed by Adachi
et al. is a hybrid honeypot composed of both low-interaction and hight-interaction capabilities.
Honeypots can also be divided into: research and production honeypots [72]. The primary
function of a research honeypot is to extract the signatures of emerging attacks, which can be used
to improve the detection accuracy of IDSs. A thorough understanding of the observed traffic data
is time-intensive and requires analysts with comprehensive expertise in almost all network-related
fields. Moreover, the deployment of research honeypots provides little benefit in strengthening the
system security. Production honeypots are placed within the production network to mitigate risk.
Most production honeypots are low-interaction honeypots and capture limited information. Example
of production honeypot is Nepenthes [13]. Since our scheme is meant to improve security, we use
production honeypots in combination with IDSs.
A honeypot mostly does not deal with false positives like IDS since all the services simulated
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by a honeypot have no production value. All the traffic that enters and leaves a honeypot is suspicious
and should be monitored and analyzed [18]. However, not all attempts to access a honeypot are
malicious. For example, a person might mistype the address of a computer and accidentally connect
to a deployed honeypot. As a result, uncertainty is also involved in honeypots scheduling.
6.3 System Model
Both HIDSs and honeypots detect intrusions and can operate at all times. However, in-
trusion detection and system emulation consume a large amount of energy and other resources,
including memory, processor usage and disk storage. We need to balance security performance and
the resource cost by scheduling IDS and honeypot activities. The scheduling problem is modelled
as a discrete-time process. In the proposed scheme, more than one HIDS or honeypot can be active
during each time period.
We now consider an example of the hybrid system. Assume a local area network (LAN) is
equipped with K−H HIDSs and H honeypots. This brings the total number of the security devices
to K. Without loss of generality, we also assume the network topology is static and there are more
machines than available HIDSs. Inevitably, only some machines have HIDSs installed. An example
network is shown in Figure 6.1.
Suppose each HIDS can operate in three modes: monitor, prevention and sleep, which is the
action space for a HIDS. The HIDS is set to monitor for intrusion detection and can sleep for energy
saving. A preventive action might be taken by switching to prevention mode if an unauthorized
or malicious activity is identified, and consumes more resources. Similarly, the action space of a
deployed honeypot can be specified as monitor, analysis and sleep. Further analysis will be carried
out if traffic anomalies are detected.
Let S(k)(t) denote the state of an arbitrary device k (HIDS or honeypot) at time t, we assume
S(k)(t) = 〈X(i)(t), Y (k)(t)〉, where X(k)(t) represents the security condition and Y (k)(t) represents
the resource consumption level. For instance, the security state can be simply divided into: “secure”
and “compromised”. If we use the notation X to denote the state space of X(k)(t), then X =
{secure, compromised}. The state space of Y (k)(t), denoted by Y, includes three consumption levels:
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Figure 6.1: Example distributed hybrid security scheme combining HIDSs with honeypots.
• low : The device is not chosen, i.e., in the sleep mode.
• medium: The device is working in the monitor mode.
• high: The HIDS/honeypot is working in prevention/analysis mode.
Since the IDSs used are HIDSs, each HIDS only monitors the machine it resides on, ignoring
the rest of the network. As a decentralized control scheme, the decision to activate a certain security
device is based on local observations. To complete the problem, we assume the observation space
is identical to the space of security conditions, i.e., O = X = {“secure”, “compromised”}. Note
that an intrusion alarm does not necessarily mean there is an attack, and vice versa. Intrusion
detection can make two types of errors: false positive (FP) and false negative (FN). A large volume
of FPs result in lots of time wasted on determining whether an alert is an attack when it is actually
benign [15]. FNs result in security holes due to failing to raise alarms when intrusions occur. Since
the goal of intrusion detection is to precisely differentiate the intrusions from legitimate behaviors,
both errors are significant performance indexes of IDSs and have been embodied in the observation
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probabilities. For instance, the following observation probability
Pr{O(k)(t+ 1) = “compromised” | A(k)(t) = “monitor”, S(k)(t+ 1) = 〈secure,medium〉} (6.1)
is equal to the FP rate of device k.
The local state of each host in the network is closely related to the security posture of the
entire network. The analysis is divided into two cases:
• Switching between different modes of an HIDS will change the power-consumption level of the
local machine but have no influence on the attack activities in the LAN;
• The activation of a honeypot will positively impact the network’s operation and security by
distracting adversaries away from the valuable resources in the LAN, and accordingly will
mitigate the threat posed to the rest of the network.
It is obvious from the preceding analysis that the choice of each agent may affect the state of the
entire network. This makes the DEC-POMDP a more suitable tool to model the scheduling for the
distributed system. Some might argue that a centralized controller can also be adopted in this case.
However, a common drawback exists in most centralized controls: it may consume a prohibitive
amount of bandwidth and instantaneous communication between the agents and the controller.
In addition, possible security breaches are brought in since the transmitted information may be
intercepted by the adversaries. Therefore, the DEC-POMDP is generally more preferable.
6.4 DEC-POMDP Formulation for the Distributed Hybrid
Security System Combining IDS & Honeypot
We define the state of the DEC-POMDP formulation at time t, denoted by S(t), as the
combination of S(k)(t), i = 1, 2, · · · ,K. Notationally,
S(t) = [S(1)(t), S(2)(t), · · · , S(K)(t)]
Similarly, we can write the action of time t as
A(t) = [A(1)(t), A(2)(t), · · · , A(K)(t)]
94
We now consider the state transition law. The state S(t) evolves based on a (|X |×|Y|)-state Markov
decision process. Let W denote the state transition probability function, then
W (s, a, s′) = Pr{S(t+ 1) = s′|S(t) = s, A(t) = a}
where s, s′ ∈ SK and a ∈ AK .
The observation probabilities of the DEC-POMDP formulation are slightly different from
the standard model defined in Section 2.3.4. As indicated in (6.1), the quantities of the observations
probabilities are assigned according to the FP and FN rates of the devices. Consequently, the
observation of each agent only depends on the local information. It follows that V (k)(a, s′, o′), the
observation probability of device i is given by
V (k)(a, s′, o′) = Pr{O(k)(t+ 1) = o′ | A(k)(t) = a, S(k)(t+ 1) = s′}






The values of the immediate rewards are assigned according to the following rules: A successful
detection of an attack results in a large reward; On the contrary, an unnecessary further analysis
staged due to a misjudgement will cause a large penalty, so will the misdetection of an attack;
Furthermore, monitoring is not free and monitoring a secure machine comes at a small penalty.
6.5 NLP-based Solution of the DEC-POMDP
The scheduling model for the hybrid system is a DEC-POMDP. Thus, we need to augment
the POMDP solution method in (5.40) to situations of multiple controllers. As was mentioned in
Section 2.3.4, the solution of a DEC-POMDP consists of a set of policy graphs, one for each agent.
Accordingly, the goal is to optimize a set of FSCs. We will show in the followings that the extension
of the NLP-based solution in (5.40) to DEC-POMDP is very straightforward. In order to present
the algorithm for DED-POMDPs, we make the following assumptions:
• There are K agents in the DEC-POMDP.
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• The state space of the DEC-POMDP is denoted by S. Each agent has the same action space
A (“prevention” of an IDS corresponds to “analysis” of a honeypot) and observation space O.
• Each agent chooses the actions according to a fixed-size FSC. The set of the nodes in the FSC
of agent k is denoted by N (k).
• We use the notation n to denote a vector of length K, where n(k) ∈ N (k). The observation
vector o and the action vector a are defined likewise.
• xk(n, a) and yk(n, o′, n′) are the control variables of the FSC of agent k.
The formal representation of the NLP-based solution of DEC-POMDPs satisfying the above as-
sumptions is:
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′) = 1, for k = 1, 2, · · · ,K
(6.3)
The optimal solution to the NLP in (6.3) provides an optimal set of FSCs of the given size. The
solution representation owes its availability to one critical factor: each agent behaves independently.
That is, all the policy graphs are independent from each other.
6.6 Summary
This chapter starts with the introduction of the two security technologies adopted in the
proposed security scheme. We choose HIDS, in combination with honeypot with the purpose to
integrate the advantages of both tools in our system. We formulate the decentralized control of
the system as a DEC-POMDP. In the end of the chapter, we show how to extend the FSC-based





Stochastic models are used extensively in science and engineering to explain and predict
natural processes. In this work, we investigate the application of Markov models to network security.
To start, we explore a security vulnerability of Tor, which is the most popular anonymous
overlay networks. The main reason for Tor being widely adopted is its low-latency feature, which,
preserves the timing signatures of the anonymous connections. We conduct side channel attacks
against Tor based on the time delays between every pair of successive packets. In the attack, the
adversaries can identify the protocols used by the initiators of the connections by eavesdropping on
the respective communication partners. HMMs represent the timing pattern of the communication
protocol, which can be inferred from the data collected by the attacker to break anonymity. The
statistical confidence of the inferred HMM is an important implementation issue for the proposed
attack.
Many researchers have developed methods to determine if the model appropriately matches
the data. We find the level of confidence that the model and data represent process under observation.
Our method uses the observation data to dynamically determine an upper bound on the probability
of an unobserved transition occurring. If this upper bound is not sufficient for the observed situation,
we explain how user-defined thresholds can be used to determine new bounds. On the other hand,
the assumption of finite states and stationary transitions keeps the constructed HMM from being
overtrained. However, as stated in Section 3.1 our approach should be free of the problem of
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overtaining even when this assumption does not hold. Some of the undesired patterns would be
excluded from the constructed model due to the threshold ǫ.
In addition to exploring the security vulnerabilities of existing products, more effective and
adaptive measures are needed to tackle new attacks. IDSs and honeypots can be combined to
improve network security. We present a distributed scheme combining HIDSs and honeypots. Since
all devices are placed in the production network, judicious management of available resources impacts
the performance of the application. As a result, methods that optimize device scheduling have great
importance. The scheduling of the proposed application is formulated as an average DEC-POMDP.
This allows each HIDS and honeypot to independently make decisions. In the proposed scheme, the
security devices are dynamically selected based on the current security posture and resources.
Little research has been done on POMDP and DEC-POMDP with average performance
criterion. We propose three different solution techniques for average POMDP: In the first approach,
we observe the output of the POMDP when the core MDP is configured to operate optimally.
The solution is generated by specifying the mapping between the action selection and a fix-length of
history. The second approach considers policies of the same form as the first approach. Given the set
of policies under consideration, the original POMDP problem is converted into a NLP . The optimal
policy of the given form is obtained by solving the resulting NLP. The difference of the last method
discussed here from the second approach is that we extend the policy space to the set of all FSCs of
a fixed size. The optimal FSC is then in a similar way as described in the second approach. Each
of the proposed methods has shown their advantages in solving some of the benchmark problems.
Finally, we show how to extend the FSC-based approach to the planning for DEC-POMDP.
7.2 Suggestions for Future Research
For the model confidence algorithm, it is possible that other models with different state and
transition structures would produce equivalent sequences to the underlying process. Future work
could look at using graph matching to determine if the constructed models are equivalent to the
initial model. Additional future directions for this work could be extending the approach for use
on other processes that handle finite state automata. It would be interesting to see if this approach
could be adapted to provide a level of confidence to probabilistic context free grammars generated
from observations [64].
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It is obvious that the follow-up work of the hybrid security system is to carry out practical
experimentation to verify the effectiveness of the system in enhancing the network security. On the
other hand, the obtained experimental results will also illustrate that the fixed-size optimal FSC for
each agent can be generated by solving the NLP in (6.3).
There is direction for the proposed POMDP solution technique, which would have a broader
application in network security. The work discussed throughout this dissertation is all about decision
process. Even in the DEC-POMDP all the agents work cooperatively to achieve the shared goal.
Therefore, there is no essential difference between POMDP and DEC-POMDP from the perspective
of decision makers. But, the real substance of any network security scenario is a zero-sum game
between the attacker and the system administrator. All things considered, the resulting model
should be a partially observable stochastic game (POSG). The feasibility of any decision process is
based on the assumption that the opponent always responses following some known pattern, which is
not always the case especially in such a complex environment like networks. Since POSG is a more
comprehensive model for security issues, it would be more promising if the NLP-based approach




Appendix A POMDP Benchmark Problems
In this appendix, we describe of some of the POMDP benchmark problems used to testify
the proposed algorithms. Hopefully, this will given readers a better idea about how and under what
conditions POMDPs should be applied.
Bridge
Hugh Ellis et al. discuss a bridge inspection and repair problem in [42]. Consider a one-
lane and two-girder highway bridge. Corrosion of the girders is the main cause of the resistance
deterioration. By assuming the girders have the same initial strengths, the performance of the
bridge is defined according to the deterioration rate of the initial strength and is divided into five
states:
• ≤ 5%;
• > 5% and ≤ 15%;
• > 15% and ≤ 25%;
• > 25%; and
• the bridge has failed.
The transitions between the states are given by a stationary Markov chain.
For maintenance, the bridge is inspected every the other year. Two types of actions are
available: inspection actions and maintenance actions. The former is divided into no inspection,
visual inspection and nondestructive ultrasonic evaluation. If no inspection is taken, the bridge
is considered to in good condition, i.e., in state 1. The visual inspection will have three possible
outcomes: good, fair and poor. The ultrasonic evaluation will measure web and flange thickness loss
in girders, and should theoretically tell the state of the bridge. But the measurement results could
be error-corrupted. The observation probabilities of each inspection strategy are provided.
Maintenance actions include no action, cleaning and repairing corroded surfaces, repainting
and strengthening deteriorated girders and extensive structural repair. The matrices of the state
transition probabilities of each action are also given. Undoubtly, all actions come with costs. The
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maintenance problem is suitably modelled as a POMDP with the objective to maintain bridge
performance the at minimum costs.
Tiger
The tiger problem is described in detail in Section 5.3.6.
Paint
This problem is from the work presented in [41] by Draper, et al. Suppose a manufacturing
robot needs to process some flawed (FL), as well as blemished (BL) widgets. The procedure includes
first painting (PA) the widget, then processing (PR) it and finally notifying (NO) the supervisor
when it is done. In the PR step, the robot can either reject parts that are flawed or ship those that
are not (FL).
The robot cannot tell if widget is flawed by can determine if it is blemished through inspec-
tion. The inspect action has two outcomes, either ok or bad. Due to the initial correlation between
FL and BL, the inspection results also reveal some information about if the widget is FL or not.
However, the inspection results may be inaccurate sometimes. For instance, we can receive a ok
one out of ten times even if the widget is actually blemished. In addition, painting only removes a
blemish with flaws remaining. As a result, inspecting the widget after having it painted would not
tell us anything about whether it is flawed or not. The processing of these widgets is completed by
modelling it as a POMDP.
Shuttle
This is an example that appears in Chrisman’s paper [34], in which he discusses the transit
of supplies between two separated spaces stations. Each station has a dock. The transporter must to
attach to the dock before loading or unloading. A successful attachment generates a reward of +10.
Since the attachment needs to be performed with its back toward the dock, collisions are hardly
avoidable and each collision results in a penalty of -3.
Three actions are available to the transporter: GoForward, Backup and TurnAround. De-
pending the current state, GoForward will detach the transporter from the dock, launch into free
space, approach the other dock or collide. Backup is the inverse of GoForward except it is extremely
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unreliable. For example, a Backup action launches from a station with certain probability. If the
transporter does a Backup in the docking position, it might fail to dock. If the action fails, the
transporter may stay where it was, or sometimes could be randomly turned around.
Due to the limited perception, the transporter can only see the station in front of it or
free space. There is uncertainty in the free space perception. The transporter may not see the
front station and thinks it is just free space. Since the two stations are identical except that the
most-recently visited one has a sign on it. But the transporter cannot see the sign unless it sees the
station. There are also some other constraints needed to be taken into account during the transit.
Interested readers can refer to [34] for a complete description of the problem. An optimal planner
of the shuttle problem is obtained using the POMDP model.
Tag
The tag problem [52] is motivated by the popular game “laser tag”. Consider a grid area,
in which a robot tries to pursue and tag a moving target. The movement of the target follows a
stochastic pattern which is known to the robot. It is assumed that the robot does not know where
the target is unless the target is in the square next to it. The goal of the robot is to tag the target
as soon as possible, which can also be phrased as tag the target as many times as possible in a
fixed-length of time. The optimal planning for the robot can be obtained by formulating tag as a
POMDP. Many POMDP algorithms have been tested using this example because of the flexibility
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